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ARTICLE
TIME TO REPAIR THE CHAIN: VOID DEEDS,
SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS, AND THE
TEXAS RECORDING STATUTES
RICHARD E. FLINT*

The line it is drawn / The curse it is cast / The slow one now / Will later befast /
As the present now / Will later be past /
The orderis rapidlyfadin' / And thefirst one now will later be last / For the times they
are a-changin'l
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of Texas jurisprudence, the Texas Supreme
Court has often made clear and concise pronouncements of a rule of law
that was to apply in all cases that fell under the parameters of that rule.2
However, that same history establishes that Texas courts have often made
exceptions to the application of these legal rules in situations where the
application would perpetrate a fraud 3 or would be inequitable. 4 For
example, in Johnson v. Porwood,5 the Texas Supreme Court stated: "Our
decisions hold that an equitable mortgage cannot be created by an
agreement not in writing." 6 However, in that case, the court noted there
was an equitable exception to this very rule of law.' The court held an
oral agreement to give a lien upon property to secure money advanced by
another to enable a purchaser to acquire the property would be enforced
in equity as a mortgage.' The court stated that the oral agreement had to
2. See, e.g.,
Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1908, writ refd) ("One
holding under a void title cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser." (first citing Daniels v.
Mason, 38 S.W. 161, 162 (Tex. 1896); and then citing Terry v. Cutler, 39 S.W. 152, 156 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1896, writ ref d))).
3. See, e.g., Floyd v. Hammond, 268 S.W. 146, 147 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't adopted)
(indicating where purchase money for land was advanced under an oral agreement that the purchaser
would execute a lien, such agreement would be viewed as an equitable mortgage to prevent a fraud
(citations omitted)).
4. See Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. 1942) (concluding "it would be inequitable
to permit" a mortgagor to show that a foreclosure sale was void as to subsequent purchasers when
the mortgagor "made it possible for the trustee to create the appearance of good tide" in the
purchaser at the void foreclosure sale); Steffian v. Milmo Nat'l Bank, 6 S.W. 823, 824-25 (Tex. 1888)
(holding a grantor could be equitably estopped from stating a conveyance was invalid for failure to
consent to the delivery of the deed when the grantor "was grossly negligent in permitting the deed"
to be delivered to the grantee).
5. Johnson v. Portwood, 34 S.W. 596 (Tex. 1896).
6. Id. at 599 (first citing Castro v. Illies, 13 Tex. 229, 233 (1854); and then citing Boehl v.
Wadgymar, 54 Tex. 589, 592 (1881)).
7. See id. at 600 (reasoning the exception applies to avoid the operation of fraud upon one who
provides purchase money for land under an oral contract to receive a lien on said land).
8. See id.
("ITlhe payment of the money by him, under the circumstances alleged, was such a part
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be enforced to prevent a fraud against the lender.9 Later courts have
never called this exception into question. 1 °
Texas courts have also announced the legal rule that one cannot be an
innocent purchaser for value if there is a void deed in that purchaser's
chain of title.1 1 However, just as in the case of the equitable mortgage,
Texas courts have made exceptions to this rule of law. 12 For example, in

Slaughter v. Qualls,13 the court of civil appeals held subsequent grantees
from the original purchaser at a void nonjudicial foreclosure sale were
protected as innocent purchasers for value despite the fact that the original
purchaser's trustee's deed was void.1 4 On appeal, the supreme court, by
way of obiter dicta, explained the legal reasoning of the court of civil
appeals' holding-that those who purchased interests or took liens from
the purchaser at the void foreclosure sale acquired good tide as against the
mortgagor-in the following words:
[T]his is so not on the theory that the title actually passed, but rather on the
theory that Quails, [the mortgagor,] by the execution of the deed of trust,
made it possible for the trustee to create the appearance of good tide in Mrs.
Slaughter, [the purchaser at the void foreclosure sale,] and it would be
inequitable to permit Qualls[, the mortgagor,] now to show otherwise as
15
against those who have purchased in good faith in reliance thereon.

However, the application of equitable principles to protect subsequent
performance as entitled him to its enforcement, so far as his rights are concerned.").
9. See id. (granting specific performance to avoid a fraud from being perpetrated upon one
who, under an oral contract to receive a lien upon land, supplied purchase money for the acquisition
of said land).
10. See Woods v. West, 37 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved,
judgm't affirmed) (recognizing the well settled law that "[w]here purchase money of land is advanced
under oral agreement that the purchaser will execute a mortgage or give a lien as security, such
agreement is enforceable in equity as a mortgage"); Bagley v. Pollock, 19 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1929, no writ) (citing the Portwood case for the proposition that an equitable
mortgage would be imposed to prevent a fraud on a lender advancing money to another for the
purchase of land under an oral agreement that a lien would be given to the lender (citations
omitted)).
11. E.g.,
Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. API. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex. 2013)
(applying the rule to deny a subsequent purchaser innocent purchaser status (quoting Wall v.
Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (rex. Civ. App. Austin 1908, writ ref'd))), revg City of Edinburg v.
API. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010).
12. See infra Part IIIB.
13. Slaughter v. Qualls, 149 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941), aft', 162 S.W.2d 671
(Tex. 1942).
14. See id. at 656 (holding the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict for the
subsequent transferees).
15. Slaughter v. Qualls, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. 1942) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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transferees following void nonjudicial foreclosure sales has recently been
called into question. In Texas Department of Transportaion v. A.P.L Ppe &

Supply, LLC,'6 the Texas Supreme Court unequivocally reaffirmed the rule
of law concerning the legal effect of a void instrument in a purchaser's
chain of title in the following words:
The court of appeals held that API was a good-faith purchaser for
value. However, we refused the writ of error in a case holding that this
doctrine does not protect a purchaser whose chain of title includes a void deed "One
a void tide cannot claim protection as an innocent
holding under
17
purchaser."

Then, later in that opinion, the supreme court flatly rejected the obiter
dicta of its earlier Slaughteropinion by asserting:
[That court] suggests that a recorded but void foreclosure sale could protect
a subsequent good-faith purchaser. However, the statement was dicta
because the subsequent purchaser's claim was not before the [c]ourt. In any
event, the Slaughter dicta suggests that such purchasers merit protection
under equitable estoppel principles... and not under the innocentpurchaser doctrine codified in the Property Code. Section 13.001 defines
the elements of innocent-purchaser status for all cases, and courts may not
disregard or rewrite the statute when they believe straight-up application

16. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. 2013), revg City
of Edinburg v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010). This
Article will use the names utilized by the Texas Supreme Court, which include "API," "TxDOT,"
and "City of Edinburg" or "the City." See id. at 165 (referring to the City of Edinburg as "the City,"
the Texas Department of Transportation as "TxDOT," and A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC and Paisano
Service Company, Inc. as "API," collectively).
17. Id. at 168 (emphasis added) (quoting Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (rex. Civ. App.Austin 1908, writ refd)). It should be noted that because the Wall v. Lubbock case, which A.P. relied
on, was decided before 1927, the fact that writ of error was refused by the Texas Supreme Court did
not necessarily mean the supreme court approved of the court of civil appeals' opinion or reasoning.
Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Koepsel, 322 S.W.2d 609, 614 n.6 (rex. 1959) (citations omitted);
see also City of San Angelo v. Deutsch, 91 S.W.2d 308, 312 (rex. 1936) (darifying that, before the law
was amended, the supreme court's refusal of an application for writ of error did not reflect that the
legal principles announced and judgment reached by the court of civil appeals were determined
correctly).
The court of appeals held API was a good faith purchaser for value under the Texas Property
Code, rather than under the equitable doctrine of innocent purchaser. See City of Edinburg v. A.P.I.
Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82, 90-91 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010) (holding while one
could not acquire an adverse interest against a governmental unit under the equitable doctrine of
innocent purchaser, one could acquire that status under the statute because governmental units were
subject to the statute's application), rev'd sub nom. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC,
397 S.W.3d 162 (rex. 2013).
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5

would be inequitable. The statute is categorical and makes no case-by-case
exceptions: A purchaser with nolice of an adverse interest cannot claim innocent18
purchaser status.
Taken together, these two pronouncements by the A.P.I. court appear to
announce a change in the legal status of a creditor or a subsequent
purchaser following a void nonjudicial foreclosure sale. 1 9 First, the court
reaffirmed the rule of law that the mere existence of a void instrument in
one's chain of tide is sufficient to deprive one of innocent purchaser
status.20
However, this first statement was not qualified by the
requirement concerning "notice of an adverse interest" that the court in
the second pronouncement stated was the defining principle in the
determination of innocent purchaser status in "all cases." 2 1 Clearly, actual
knowledge that an instrument in one's chain of title is void will give
corresponding notice of the existence of an adverse interest, thereby
22
depriving a subsequent purchaser of innocent purchaser status.
However, notice of the existence of an instrument in one's chain of tide
may or may not result in a legal determination that such document is
void. 23 While it is correct to assert that "a purchaser is deemed to have

18. A.P.I, 397 S.W.3d at 169 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also TEX. PROP. CODE
13.001 (West 2016) (voiding unrecorded conveyances and interests in real property as against
creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration).
19. Compare A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 169 (denying courts the ability to deem an individual an
innocent purchaser through the application of equitable principles, and rather requiting such status to
be based upon the elements set forth in the Texas Property Code one of which is "notice of an
adverse interest"), with Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675 (concluding the party who purchased an interest
in or took a lien on the property from the individual who purchased at a void foredosure was an
innocent purchaser as the mortgagor made it possible for the original purchaser to appear to have
good tide and it would be inequitable to hold otherwise (citations omitted)).
20. A.P.I., 397 S.W.3d at 168 (quoting Wall, 118 S.W. at 888).
21. Id. at 168-69. It is not clear whether the court is abolishing the equitable doctrine of
innocent purchasers or merely stating that the elements of innocent purchaser status are the same in
both the statutory and the equitable doctrines with notice of an adverse interest as the driving
principle. See id. (rejecting Slaughter for its suggestion that a purchaser should be protected under
principles of equity rather than the statute that codified the doctrine, but failing to abolish the
equitable doctrine (citations omitted)).
22. See id. at 169 (denying purchasers who had "notice of an adverse interest" innocent
purchaser status); Noice, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (indicating an individual has
notice of a condition or fact if the individual has actual knowledge of its existence).
23. Cf Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,
writ ref d n.r.e.) ("Even if a conveyance is regular on its face, it does not always or necessarily operate
to pass tide between the parties at the time of its execution, particularly in cases of fraud. A deed
may be presumptively valid, and yet be utterly void as a conveyance when the presumption is
rebutted.").
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notice of all recorded instruments" in his chain of title,2 4 it does not
necessarily follow that actual notice of all such instruments will lead to a
determination that an instrument in that chain of tide is void.2 5 Thus, if
notice of an adverse interest is the defining element for determining
innocent purchaser status in "all cases," 26 one should be able to claim

innocent purchaser status when he does not have actual knowledge that an
instrument in his chain of title is void, because in such a situation he would
have no notice of an adverse interest. 27 However, the A.P.I. case
apparently rejects this analysis. 28 Harmonizing the two pronouncements
in A.P.I., one might conclude the mere existence of a void instrument in
one's chain of title charges one with notice as a matter of law of not only the
existence of such instrument but also of its legal effect and, thus, notice of
the corresponding adverse interest. 29 Of course, this interpretation of the
two pronouncements from the A.P.I. case is contrary to the holding of the

24. A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 169.
25. See Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 673-74 (Tex. 1942) ("[T]here is nothing on the face
of the trustee's deed that would render it void.... The substitute trustee's deed contained all recitals
necessary to show a valid sale by him.").
26. A.PI., 397 S.W.3d at 169 (emphasis added).
27. Cf Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 141 S.W.2d 1030, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cot.) (concluding parties who purchased property from the
purchaser at a void foreclosure sale were innocent purchasers for value since the original purchaser
and the subsequent purchasers did not have "notice of any infirmities therein').
had apparent title
28. See A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 168-69 (denying innocent purchaser protection if an instrument
has been recorded since recorded instruments charge a purchaser with knowledge of their provisions
and contents).
29. The A.PI. court noted that API was "constructively and actually aware of the recorded 2003
Judgment." Id.at 169. That judgment awarded the City of Edinburgfee-simple fitle to the land in
question. Id at 167. In addition, API had actual knowledge of the existence of the 2004 Judgment
(the void judgment) that awarded the City merely an easement in the land in question. City of
Edinburg v. A.P.. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82, 91 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010), rev'd
sub nor. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. 2013). API
argued that "even if the 2004 Judgment was void," it was still an innocent purchaser. A.P.I.,
397 S.W.3d at 168. The supreme court rejected this argument, noting that a purchaser holding under
a void deed cannot be an innocent purchaser, and held as API had actual notice of the 2003
Judgment, it was on notice of that adverse interest and, thus, could not be an innocent purchaser
under the terms of the Texas Property Code. Id.at 168-69. Thus, under the facts of the case, the
court did not need to address whether the mere existence of a void instrument in one's chain of tide
charges one, as a matter of law, with knowledge of the legal effects of such instrument and the
at 169 (failing to indicate a purchaser has notice
corresponding notice of an adverse interest. See id.
of an adverse interest as a matter of law, but stating the purchaser "was responsible for squaring the
contradictory" instruments). Of course, the recording of a void instrument does not constitute
constructive notice. See Stiles v. Japhet, 19 S.W. 450, 452 (Tex. 1892) (per curiam) (concluding the
recording of a void deed conveyed no actual or constructive notice of an earlier deed conveying the
land in question); Terry v. Cutler, 39 S.W. 152, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1896, writ refd)
(deciding the recording of a void deed did not convey notice of its contents).
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court of civil appeals in the Slaughtercase, which held notice was afact question
and concluded that because there was no evidence in that case that the
instrument in
creditors or subsequent purchasers had notice of the void
30
purchasers.
innocent
as
their chain of tide, they qualified
The confusion and uncertainty as to the status of creditors and
subsequent purchasers with a void instrument in their chain of title was
exacerbated later in the same A.P.I. opinion. When addressing whether
equitable estoppel could be asserted in the case against the governmental
entity, the court stated:
API argues that TxDOT's acquiescence to the 2004 Judgment bars it
from objecting now to what it accepted then. While the argument has a
certain force-purchasers should be able to rely upon facially valid
estoppel, a doctrine inapplicable
judgments-this argument goes to 3 equitable
1
against the government in this case.
This statement by the court seemingly acknowledges the possibility that
equity might protect a subsequent purchaser who relied upon an agreed
facially valid instrument forming a link in his chain of title, even when that
very instrument was void,3 2 notwithstanding the court's earlier assertions
that one could not be an innocent purchaser when there was a void
instrument in such purchaser's chain of title and that equitable principles
could not trump knowledge of an adverse interest to create innocent
purchaser status.3 3 This statement, of course, was also the precise legal
34
basis of the obiter dicta in the supreme court's Slaughter case, which the
3 ' The A.P.I.
A.P.I. court disparaged and rejected earlier in its opinion.
36
case has not only called into question time honored precedents, but it
30. Slaughter v. Quails, 149 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941) (recognizing the
record was devoid of any evidence that established the subsequent creditors or purchasers "had any
knowledge of the" improper manner in which the foreclosure sale was conducted), aft'd, 162 S.W.2d
671 (Tex. 1942).
31. A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 170 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 168, 170 (explaining that since the agreed, facially valid judgment was void, it did
not convey title to the property in question, and thus, a purchaser from the purported owner of that
property could not buy what his vendor did not own, but also recognizing the "force" in the
argument that "purchasers should be able to rely upon facially valid judgments").
33. Id. at 169.
34. See Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (rex. 1942) (noting the mortgagor had
and
authorized the trustee to cloak the purchaser at the foreclosure sale with apparent legal title,
therefore, holding it would be "inequitable to permit" the mortgagor to establish otherwise "against
those who purchased in good faith in reliance thereon" (citations omitted)).
35. A.P.I., 397 S.W.3d at 169.
at 168-69 (indicating "one cannot be 'innocent' of a recorded' instrument in one's
36. Compare id.
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has also muddled the law concerning the status of creditors and
subsequent purchasers when there is a void instrument in their chain of
title. Therefore, clarification, correction, and direction are needed in this
area of the law.
This Article examines and evaluates Texas courts' treatment of
subsequent purchasers prior to the A.P.I. decision in cases where there
was a void instrument in such purchaser's chain of title. 3 7 In doing so,
this Article examines and evaluates whether the Texas rule of law holding
that "[o]ne holding under a void title cannot claim protection as an
innocent purchaser," 3 8 as reaffirmed in the A.P.I case,3 9 is in the best
interest of Texas jurisprudence. Part II of this Article traces the legal
development of the innocent purchaser for value status in Texas. Part II
discusses the distinctions between the equitable doctrine and its statutory
counterpart. Part III of this Article then examines some of the major
historical developments in Texas jurisprudence concerning the legal effect
of a void instrument in one's chain of title. Specifically, this third section
reviews Texas courts' treatment of subsequent purchasers following void
nonjudicial foreclosure sales. In doing so, the Slaughter case will be
thoroughly examined and evaluated. In addition, this part of the Article
examines other situations where Texas courts have made equitable
exceptions to protect subsequent purchasers when void instruments were
in their chain of title. Part IV focuses on the Texas law of actual and
constructive notice as it relates to instruments in one's chain of title.
Initially, the fourth part of the Article investigates the scope of inquiry
notice imposed by the supreme court on subsequent purchasers
concerning instruments in their chain of tide.4 ° Then, the A.P.I. case will
be examined and analyzed in light of the then-Texas jurisprudence dealing
chain of title), with Slaughter v. Quails, 149 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941)
(concluding the subsequent purchasers and creditors were protected under the innocent purchaser
doctrine since the record was devoid of any evidence that they had any knowledge of the manner in
which the foreclosure sale was conducted), affd, 162 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1942).
37. See, e.g.,Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 141 S.W.2d 1030, 1034 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) (determining the trustee's deed was void, but
applying the equitable doctrine of innocent purchaser to protect the parties who bought from

"another who ha[d] the apparent titie, without notice of the infirmities therein, and who pa[id] a
valuable consideration therefor").

38. Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1908, writ ref d) (first citing
Daniels v. Mason, 38 S.W. 161, 162 (rex. 1896); and then citing Terry v. Cutler, 39 S.W. 152, 156

(rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1896, writ ref d)).
39. A.P.., 397 S.W.3d at 168 (quoting Wall,118 S.W. at 888).
40. See Flack v. First Nat'l Bank of Dalhart, 226 S.W.2d 628, 632 (rex. 1950) ("[W]hatever fairly

puts a person upon inquiry is actual notice of the facts which would have been discovered by
reasonable use of the means at hand." (citations omitted)).
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with notice and the effect of such notice on subsequent purchasers. In
addition, Part IV of the Article details the ambiguity and confusion that
the A.P.I. case has generated in those situations where a void instrument is
in a subsequent purchaser's chain of title. This Article concludes with
recommendations for the enactment of legislation by the Texas Legislature
to protect subsequent purchasers for value who have no knowledge of the
existence of a void instrument in their chain of tide.
II.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE INNOCENT PURCHASER AND
THE EFFECT OF RECORDING

4 1
A system of land registration was unknown in the early common law.4 2
The initial common law rule was "first in time, first in right."
Eventually, this early common law approach was supplanted by a system
requiring the transfer of land to be evidenced in writing and recorded to be
effective as a conveyance. 43 The system proved ineffective as lawyers

41. Under early English common law, there were no registration laws providing for the
recording of deeds and other documents relating to title to land. See 3A ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD &
NANCY SAINT-PAUL, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND TITLE EXAMINATION 5 11.5
(3d ed. Supp. 2016) (distinguishing the common law approach, which lacked a "system of registration
or recording," from the types of recording systems existing in the United States (citation omitted)).
The practice of land transfer in the early common law was briefly explained as follows:
Prior to the seventeenth century the typical form of conveyance of a present freehold estate
in land was the feoffment with livery of seisin. A "feoffment" was the grant of a fief or feudal
tenement, and "livery of seisin" was the means by which the grant was effected.... If 0 was
seised of Blackacre in fee simple absolute and wished to convey his estate to B, it was necessary
that 0 invest B with the seisin. This was done by means of a feoffment with livery of seisin, or
more shortly, a feoffment. 0 and B, or their agents, would go upon the land and 0 would
formally "give" or "deliver" the seisin to B in the presence of witnesses from the neighborhood.
0 would usually hand over to B a branch, twig, or piece of turf as a symbol of the land,
although this ceremonial act was not essential. What was essential was the investiture of B with
the seisin. Thus, 0, the feoffor, must declare that he gives the seisin to the feoffee, B; and
having installed B in occupancy of the land, 0 must completely relinquish the possession.
SHELDON F. KURTz, MOYNIHAN'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 223 (6th ed.
2015). Eventually, the livery of seisin was replaced with a document of conveyance and its
registration under the recording acts. See Watkins v. Edwards, 23 Tex. 443, 449 (1859) (discussing
the system of registering documents effecting title to land, and noting the registration system
replaced the livery of seisin).
42. Dwight A. Olds, The Scope of the Texas Recording Act, 8 Sw. L.J. 36, 43 (1954). "]he rule
between claimants of the same title was found in the maxim 'prior in tempore potior est in jure,'
which means, he who is first in time has the better right." LEOPOLD & SAINT-PAUL, supra note 41.
See generally 14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01 [1][a], at 82-4 to -5
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2016) (admitting the recording statutes
abrogated the common law first-in-time rule in most cases).
43. See John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: A Recording Acts Guidefor First Year Law Students,
80 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 91, 98 (2002) (recognizing the purpose of the English Statute of
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developed methods to circumvent the registration requirement to avoid

the fees for registering and to keep transactions out of the public's
knowledge. 4 4 Furthermore, the equity courts developed the equitable
doctrine of bona fide purchaser to protect subsequent purchasers who did
not have actual notice of recorded instruments. 45 However, unlike the
English system,4 6 there have been recording statutes in Texas that have

Enrollments was to give notoriety to land ownership by requiring the registration of interests after
the conveyance). This development was briefly described as follows:
Written documents later came into use merely as a convenient method of memorializing the
terms of the conveyance. In 1535 the Statute of Uses was enacted and it became possible to
convey property without a public ceremony of enfeoffmen. In 1536 the Statute of Enrollment
was passed as a companion bill to the Statute of Uses. The Statute of Enrollment proved
largely ineffective. In its final version it only covered bargain and sale of freehold estates which,
under the act, had to be accomplished by a sealed writing enrolled in one of the king's courts of
record within six months.
The Statute of Enrollment was not well received from the beginning. It frequently was
avoided by a one-year lease, creating a leasehold estate not covered by the statute and followed
immediately by a release of the reversion to the lessee-purchaser. In 1677 the Statute of Frauds
was enacted and written documents became necessary for the creation or transfer of most real
property interests. It was now possible to create interests in land without public ceremony or
public knowledge.
However, under the English common law all deeds to real property went with the land to the
purchaser. There was no system of recording to preserve the evidence of transfer or documents
of tide. When the owner wished to sell real estate or pledge it as a mortgage security, ownership
was demonstrated by producing the original deeds and other instruments affecting title to the
property.
Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System, PROB. & PROP.,
May/June 1989, at 27, 27. See generally Scheid, supra, at 92-100 (tracing the English development of
land registration, and describing its ineffectiveness from 1620-1845 since only freehold estates were
covered by the enrollment statutes and attorneys developed mechanisms to avoid the statutes'
application).
44. See Scheid, supra note 43, at 98-99 (addressing the methods used by lawyers to avoid
registering land transfers under the enrollment statutes).
45. The bona fide purchaser doctrine was an exception to applying the enrollment rule. John G.
Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Prpery Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 540 (1996).
"Equity courts construed the seemingly absolute language of the registry statutes as protecting only
the grantee without actual notice of previously created interests." Id. (footnote omitted).
46. One author traced the development of the American system of recording to the English
precedents, and stated:
The lineage of the American title recording system may be traced to the 1536 Statute of
Enrollments, which required the registration of English deeds. Mere delivery of a deed to the
grantee was insufficient to transfer tile; a conveyance became effective only upon registry in the
"king's courts of record at Westminster." Although the statute and its successors were
eventually circumvented by various legal devices, this farsighted effort ultimately served as a
model for the highly successful American system.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

2016]

TIME TO REPAIR THE CHAIN

encouraged the recording of documents relating to real property since the
days of the Republic of Texas. 4 7 The primary purpose of Texas's
recording statutes is to provide notice of the contents of the various
recorded documents effecting title to land.4 8 As one early court explained:
[Registration] laws protect purchasers and creditors against conveyances
which could be, but are not, recorded. It is doubtless the purpose and policy
of such laws to furnish means of information to parties buying lands, as to
the condition of tides, and to protect them against all claims of which notice
should be9 found upon, but the existence of which is not disclosed by, the
4

records.

The basic consequences of recording statutes are the protection of
creditors and subsequent purchasers for value against prior deeds,
mortgages, and other instruments that are not recorded and, also, the
priority of the holder of the prior
abolishment of the common law
50
lien.
or
conveyance
unregistered
The principal Texas recording statute, entitled "Validity of Unrecorded
Instrument" and referred to as the "Innocent-Purchaser
provides as follows:

Statute,"5 "

(a) A conveyance of real property or an interest in real property or a
mortgage or deed of trust is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent
47. The encouragement stemmed from rendering unrecorded documents void as to creditors
and subsequent purchasers. See Act approved Feb. 5, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., § 4, 1840 Repub. Tex.
Laws 153, 154, rrprinted in 2 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 327, 328 (Austin,
Gammel Book Co. 1898) (proclaiming all conveyances of land, as well as all deeds of trust and
mortgages, void as to creditors and innocent purchasers for value, unless properly recorded).
48. The main purpose of the Texas registration statutes was providing notice and advising
individuals where they could acquire information concerning the state of title to land. Hancock v.
Tram Lumber Co., 65 Tex. 225, 232 (1885); see also Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 450-51
(Tex. 1988) (explaining the legislative intent behind the recording statues included the purpose of
protecting purchasers and creditors from secret grants and liens (quoting 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and
ecor&ng Laws § 48 (1973))).
49. MacGregor v. Thompson, 26 S.W. 649, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1894, no writ); see
also
Anderson v. Barnwell, 52 S.W.2d 96, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1932) (asserting the
legislative intent was to compel registration of conveyances to protect both the person who recorded
the conveyance and those who might subsequently consider acquiring an interest in the same
property), affd sub nom. Anderson v. Brawley, 86 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1935).
50. Cox v. Clay, 237 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex. 2013)
(refusing to apply the "Innocent-Purchaser Statute" on the basis that the statute does not protect
purchasers from recorded instruments, but only from unrecorded conveyances (citing TEX. PROP.
CODE § 13.001 (a) (West 2012))), revg City of Edinburg v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82
(Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2010).
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purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice unless the instrument
has been acknowledged, sworn to, or proved and filed for record as required
by law.
(b) The unrecorded instrument is binding on a party to the instrument,
on the party's heirs, and on a subsequent purchaser who does not pay a
valuable consideration or who has notice of the instrument.
(c) This section does not apply to a financing statement, a security
agreement filed as a financing statement, or a continuation
statement filed
52
for record under the Business & Commerce Code.

52. PROP. § 13.001 (West 2016). The present statute, like all of its predecessors other than the
1836 statute, specifically provides protection to creditors and subsequent purchasers for value.
Compare id. § 13.001(a) (limiting the scope of protection to creditors or subsequent purchasers
without notice and who pay valuable consideration), and Gibraltar Say. Ass'n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d
555, 557 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (viewing section 13.001 and its predecessors as
"similar in all material respects"), with Act approved Dec. 20,1836, 1st Cong., R.S., § 40, 1836 Repub.
Tex. Laws 148, 156, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 1208, 1216
(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (voiding unrecorded deeds, liens, conveyances, and other written
instruments that affect the rights and interests "of third paries" (emphasis added)), and Ryle v.
Davidson, 115 S.W. 28, 29 (Tex. 1909) (recognizing the 1836 statute was broader in scope). The
1836 statute protected all third persons whose interests would be affected by certain unrecorded
instruments. See Act approved Dec. 20, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., 5 40, 1836 Repub. Tex. Laws 148, 156,
reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 1208, 1216 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1898) (voiding deeds, conveyances, and liens affecting "the interests and rights of third parties" if the
requirements to record the instrument are not met). However, since 1840, the scope of the statute's
protection has been limited to creditors and subsequent bona fide purchasers for value. See Ryle,
115 S.W. at 29 (describing the differences between the 1836 and 1840 statutes). In discussing the
1840 Act, the Supreme Court of Texas said:
This provision is not regarded as introducing a new rule, but only as declaratory of the law, as
recognized in the chancery jurisprudence of England and the United States. It is but the
declaration of positive law to the effect that the want of registration shall avoid the deed only as
to "creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice," but that, as to "subsequent purchasers,
with notice thereof" the deed "shall nevertheless be valid and binding."
Parks v. Willard, 1 Tex. 350, 354 (1846).
pointed out:

In an early analysis of the statute, the supreme court

The statute, in plain and unmistakable language, says that unrecorded conveyances, whether
by deed or bond, are void as to two classes of persons, viz[], "all creditors" and ["]subsequent
purchasers for valuable consideration without notice." Now, it will be noted that there is a
marked distinction between these two classes of persons for whose benefit the statute was
enacted; for while such unrecorded instruments are void as to "all creditors," they are only so as
to "purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice."
Grace v. Wade, 45 Tex. 522, 526 (1876); see also GibraltarSav. Ass'n, 784 S.W.2d at 557 (deeming legal
decisions interpreting the statue's predecessors relevant to interpreting the present statute since all of
the innocent purchaser statutes since statehood have been "so similar in all material respects" (citing
PROP. § 13.001 (a) (West 1990))).
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While the language of the statute is broad, the cases have held a creditor 3
or a subsequent purchaser for value 5 4 is only charged with notice of those
instruments that form an essential link in the chain of title under which
they claim.5 5
53. The term "creditor," as used in the statute, refers to both voluntary and involuntary lien
holders. See R. A. Brown & Co. v. Chancellor, 61 Tex. 437, 444 (1884) (interpreting the statute's use
of "creditor" to apply only to those who possessed a lien on the property (first citing Ayres v.
Duprey, 27 Tex. 593, 607 (1864); and then citing Grace, 45 Tex. at 527)); McKeen v. Sultenfuss,
61 Tex. 325, 329 (1884) (determining the statute granted protection to a subsequent "creditor who,
without notice of the unrecorded deed, secures a lien upon the land by contract" or by operation of
law); Henderson v. Odessa Bldg. & Fin. Co., 24 S.W.2d 393, 393-94 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930,
judgm't affirmed) (echoing "settled law" that defines the term creditor to include one who acquired a
lien on property by judicial process or by filing a judgment of record (citations omitted)).
Apparently, the only difference between the contractual (voluntary) lienholder and the involuntary
lienholder, under the statute, relates to the burden of proving protection under the statute. See
Turner v. Cochran, 61 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex. 1901) (comparing the burdens of proof applicable to the
two types of lienholders). The voluntary lienholder must establish lack of notice of the unrecorded
prior interest; while in the case of the involuntary lien holder, the burden of proof rests on the prior
unrecorded interest to establish notice. See id. (detailing the two lienholders' burdens of proof under
the recording statutes).
54. The words "subsequent purchaser" in the innocent purchaser statute refers to purchasers
who are subsequent in chain and not subsequent in time. See White v. McGregor, 50 S.W. 564, 56566 (Tex. 1899) (noting the order of recordation is not regarded by the statute). The White v. McGregor
court explained:
As to the matter in hand, the substance of that article is to declare a deed not duly recorded
void as against subsequent purchasers for value without notice; and the question arises, what is
meant by "subsequent purchasers"? Do the words mean all persons who purchase the land
after the deed is recorded, or only those who are subsequent in the chain of tide? If a grantor
conveys the same property twice, and the second grantee puts his deed upon record, is it notice
to one who subsequently purchases from the first grantee? We think not. The record is not
notice to the first grantee, for he is a prior purchaser. Nor do we think it was intended to be
notice to any one who should purchase from him. In other words, we think the subsequent
purchasers who are meant are only those the origin of whose title is subsequent to the tide of
the grantee in the recorded deed.
Id. at 565. This analysis continued with the court noting:
A purchaser is bound to take notice of a deed from the grantor of his grantor prior to that
under which his grantor claims, although the latter may be recorded first, for the statute does
not regard the order in which the deeds appear upon the registry. But when one takes a
conveyance from another who holds under the first deed from his grantor, such purchaser is
not bound to look further for a subsequent deed from that grantor, for the reason that such
deed is out of the chain of title under which he buys.
Id. at 565-66.
55. See Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 668, 670 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ
refd) (indicating a purchaser is on notice of "every recital, reference[,] and reservation contained in
or fairly disclosed" in instruments in her chain of title (citation omitted)). "'Chain of tile' has been
defined to be '[t]he successive conveyances, commencing with the patent from the government, each
being a perfect conveyance of the title down to and including the conveyance to the present holder."'

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1

In addition to this "shall" statute,5 6 section 12.001 of the Property
Code, referred to as the "may" statute,"7 is another Texas statute
pertaining to the recording of documents relating to real property and
provides in part:
(a) An instrument concerning real or personal property may be
recorded if it has been acknowledged, sworn to with a proper jurat, or
proved according to law.
(b) An instrument conveying real property may not be recorded unless
it is signed and acknowledged or sworn to by the grantor in the presence of
two or more credible subscribing witnesses or acknowledged or sworn to
before and certified by
an officer authorized to take acknowledgements or
58
oaths, as applicable.
The final significant registration statute addresses the legal effect of
recorded documents.5 9
Section 13.002 of the Texas Property Code
provides that "[a]n instrument that is properly recorded in the proper
60
county is... notice to all persons of the existence of the instrument."

Reserve Petrol. Co. v. Hutcheson, 254 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (citations omitted).
56. See 5 ALoYsIus A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND TITLE

EXAIMINATION § 28.1 (3d ed. 2005) (identifying Texas Property Code section 13.001 as the
"innocent purchaser statute" or 'shall' statute").
57. Article 6626, which is "the so-called 'may' statute" and the predecessor to section 12.001,
did not set forth a penalty for failing to record an instrument concerning real property. Olds, supra
note 42, at 37. CompareAct effective Sept. 1, 1925, 39th Leg., R.S., tit. 115, ch. 3, art. 6626,printedin
2 Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, at 1881, 1888 (Austin, A. C. Baldwin & Sons 1925) (setting
forth a provision entitled "[w]hat may be recorded," which provides certain written instruments that
are "acknowledged or proved according to law are authoriZed to be recorded" (emphasis added)),
repealed and codified by Act of May 30, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 576, §§ 6, 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws
3475, 3729-30, 3489 (adopting nonsubstantive revisions of statutes relating to property into the
Property Code) (current version at PROP. § 12.001(a)), with PROP. § 12.001(a) (West 2016) ("An
instrument concerning real or personal property may be recordedif it has been acknowledged, sworn to
with a proper jurat, or proved according to law." (emphasis added)).
58. PROP. § 12.001(a)-(b). This statute's roots also trace back to the Republic of Texas. See Act
approved Feb. 5, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., § 5, 1840 Repub. Tex. Laws 153, 154, reprinted in 2 H.P.N.
Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 327, 328 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (authorizing
and requiring the clerks of the county courts to record any conveyance that was properly
acknowledged or proved).
59. See PROP. § 13.002(1) (establishing that a properly recorded instrument provides "notice to
all').
60. Id. This statute also traces its roots going back to the Republic of Texas. See Act approved
Feb. 5, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., 5 7, 1840 Repub. Tex. Laws 153, 155, printedin 2 H.P.N. Gammel, The
Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 327, 329 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (declaring every properly
recorded "tide, bond, or other written contract" concerning land provides all subsequent purchasers
with notice).
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While the "shall" statute voids unrecorded instruments of conveyance
or mortgages or deeds of trust as to an innocent purchaser, 6 1 there are no
adverse consequences for failing to file a document under the "may"
statute.62 However, there are significant advantages to filing all written
instruments affecting the tide to real property since properly recorded
instruments are constructive notice of the existence of such instrument.6 3
61. The Texas Supreme Court stated:
The equity of the purchaser is made by the statutes of registration a legal tight, and grows out of
the fact that he has parted with a valuable consideration for the land, without notice of the prior
grant. He is protected because the first grantee, through neglect, has put him in a position to be
defrauded.
La Pice v. Key, 30 S.W. 867, 867 (Tex. 1895); see also Hous. Oil Co. of Tex. v. Hayden, 135 S.W.
1149, 1152 (rex. 1911) (listing "[v]aluable consideration, absence of notice, and good faith" as the
elements essential to qualifying as an innocent purchaser (citation omitted)). Of course, the innocent
purchaser must acquire the interest in the property from one who qualified as the apparent owner of
the property. See Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 114 S.W.2d 226, 234 (Tex. 1938) (stating that
to be able to assert the innocent purchaser doctrine, one must "have acquired the apparent titie or
the legal title
as appearing of record to" an interest in land (citations omitted)); Waggoner v. Dodson,
73 S.W. 517, 518 (Tex. 1903) (defining the innocent purchaser under the statutes as a purchaser who
"bought from one apparently invested with titlef and.., secured from him that which on its face is
the title").
62. Specifically, an earlier version of the statute (article 6626) was referenced as the 'may'
statute." Olds, supra note 42, at 37. The earlier statute's language was equally as permissive as the
language found in the Texas Property Code today. Compare Act effective Sept. 1, 1925, 39th Leg.,
R.S., tit. 115, ch. 3, art. 6626,printedin 2 Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, at 1881, 1888 (Austin,
A. C. Baldwin & Sons 1925) (repealed and codified 1983) (providing written instruments, such as
"deeds, mortgages, and conveyances," "are authorized to be recorded' if they are "acknowledged or
proven according to law" (emphasis added)), with PROP. 5 12.001(a) ("An instrument concerning real
or personal property may berecorded if it has been acknowledged, sworn to with a proper jurat, or
proved according to law." (emphasis added)).
63. In discussing article 4652 of the Revised Civil Statutes, an early predecessor statute to Texas
Property Code section 13.002, the White court stated:
The proposition is frequently announced that under the registration laws the proper record of
an instrument authorized to be recorded is notice to all the world. Although the language of
article 4652 of the Revised Statutes gives countenance to the doctrine as thus broadly stated, it
has been decided by this court that the proposition is subject to important qualifications. For
example, [an earlier] court quote[d] with approval the following language: "The registry of a
deed is notice only to those who claim through or under the grantor by whom the deed was
executed." The doctrine was applied in the decision of that case, and the decision has been
followed in subsequent cases.
White v. McGregor, 50 S.W. 564, 564-65 (rex. 1899) (citations omitted). Compare Act effective
Sept. 1, 1895, 24th Leg., R.S., tit. XCVI, ch. 3, art. 4652, printed in Revised Civil Statutes of the State of
Texas, at 928, 937 (Austin, Eugene Von Boeckmann 1895) ('The record of any grant, deed,] or
instrument of writing authorized or required to be recorded, which shall have been... duly recorded
in the proper county, shall be taken and held as notice to all persons of the existence of such grant,
deed[,] or instrument."), with PROP. § 13.002 ("An instrument that is properly recorded in the proper
countsy is ...notice to all persons of the existence of the instrument.').
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The Texas recording statutes add to the early common law doctrine by
requiring that "the purchaser must record to get the common law
protection of a first purchaser." 6 4 More importantly, these statutes create
the focal point
a mechanism such that notice of earlier interests becomes
65
for effectuating the old common law priority system.
In addition to these statutes, Texas law recognizes the equitable doctrine
of bona fide purchaser for value, which entitles those meeting the
doctrine's requirements to defeat a much broader array of interests.6667
Specifically, this doctrine assists one who acquires legal or apparent title
64. Olds, supra note 42, at 45.
at 44-45 (recognizing recording acts benefitted land purchasers by providing notice of
65. See id.
earlier interests, and indicating "notice is usually the focal point of discussions of the recording act").
66. See id.at 48 (noting the Texas recording statutes did not eliminate the equitable doctrine of
bona fide purchaser for value). The supreme court outlined the elements of this equitable doctrine as
follows:
to
It is a well[-]recognized doctrine in equity, that a bona fide purchaser of the legal title
property, who pays a valuable consideration therefor, without notice, actual or constructive, of
to
the right of other persons is entitled to protection against others who may have equitable title
or interest in the thing purchased; and it matters not whether the thing purchased be real or
personal property.
Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610, 613 (1884) (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098,
1101 (Tex. 1925) (stating equitable tides were not governed by the registration statutes and innocent
purchasers for valuable consideration are protected against such interests under the equitable
doctrine of estoppel); Olds, supra note 42, at 44 (noting that this equitable doctrine would defeat the
common law rule of "prior in time, prior in right" in certain cases).
67. See Daniels v. Mason, 38 S.W. 161, 162 (Tex. 1896) (determining a bona fide purchaser who
purchased legal tide from one with capacity to contract would prevail over "the undisclosed equit[ies]
of another"); Moore, 62 Tex. at 613 (asserting equity protects a bona fide purchaser for value of the
or interest held by other persons).
legal tide to property who took without notice of the equitable title
in this context was described as:
The concept of legal title
As used in respect to bona fide purchasers, the word "title" has no reference to what may be
the real beneficial interest of the vendor as disclosed by extrinsic proof. It has relation merely
to what constitutes the evidence of his right. As is clearly explained in [an earlier] case, if this
were not so, there could be no instance of an innocent purchase unless the vendor were, in fact,
invested with the beneficial interest. As used in this sense, therefore, "tide" does not mean the
beneficial interest in the property conveyed. It means such written evidence as under the laws
of the state confers upon the vendor the legal estate in the land. Nothing else appearing, this
constitutes a legal tide in the vendor-the apparent tide, upon which the good-faith purchaser
may rely, though, as between himself and others, the vendor may have no actual right to the
land. "The question is not one of real beneficial ownership or of superior right, but of apparent
ownership evidenced as the law requires ownership to be."
Hennessy v. Blair, 173 S.W. 871, 873 (Tex. 1915) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Moran
v. Adler, 570 S.W.2d 883, 886 n.1 (Tex. 1978) (defining the holder of "apparent tide" as "the 'one
apparently invested with title' when viewed from the recorded instruments, 'rely[ing] on the record"'
(alteration in original) (quoting Waggoner v. Dodson, 73 S.W. 517 (Tex. 1903))); York's Adm'r v.
McNutt, 16 Tex. 13, 16 (1856) (agreeing the protection that equity gives innocent purchasers
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for value and without notice to defeat unrecorded equitable interests or

titles in real property. 68 The guiding principle behind equitably protecting
the "innocent purchaser" was aptly described as follows:
The doctrine of innocent purchaser grows out of the idea that a court
of equity will not grant relief against an innocent party where the plaintiff
has placed in the hands of another, the apparent power to cause the said
party to act to his detriment, and that where one of two innocent parties is
to suffer, then the one who has placed in the hands of another the means by
69
which a wrong is done must be the one to suffer.

Thus, a subsequent purchaser from the apparent owner of an interest in
land can use the equitable doctrine of innocent purchaser to defeat the
assertion of certain secret unrecorded equitable titles or interests,7 0 such as
the interests of equitably adopted children"1 or the interests of heirs of a

deceased wife when the title, although community, was only in the name
of the husband.7 2 It should be noted that in both of these situations the
"extends only to cases where they have taken a conveyance, or, in other words, where they have
purchased the legal title" (citations omitted)).
68. See Moore, 62 Tex. at 612 (describing equitable tide as "any right in land inferior to the legal
title, such as a court of equity, as distinguished from a court of law, in the exercise of its well[]recognized powers would enforce"). An equitable interest is defined as "[aln interest held by virtue
of an equitable title or claimed on equitable grounds." Equitable Interest, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). Clearly under the wording of the "may" recording statute, an equitable interest or
tide is not subject to being recorded to the extent that it is not in writing. Olds, supra note 42, at 39.
However, if such interest concerns real estate and is reflected in a written instrument, it "may be
recorded," and in that event, it will give constructive notice. Id. There is an exception to this general
rule. Although an executory contract for conveyance creates an equitable interest, this writing must
be recorded in certain situations. PROP. § 5.076; see also Johnson v. Wood, 157 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.
1951) (concluding a vendee under an executory contract for conveyance had merely an equitable
right until performance was made, but upon performance the equitable "right ripened into an
equitable tide" superior to the vendor's title).
69. Pure Oil Co. v. Swindall, 58 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved,
judgm'rt affirmed); see also Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 157 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1941, writ refd) (holding the rights of the equitable tide holder to real property were
inferior to the rights "of an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value without notice" because the
equitable title holder allowed "naked legal tide to remain in" another).
70. See, e.g., Edwards v. Brown, 5 S.W. 87, 89 (Tex. 1887) (stating the equitable doctrine protects
innocent purchasers "against secret tides, whether they be legal or equitable").
71. See Moran, 570 S.W.2d at 887 (agreeing with precedent that held an innocent mortgagee or
purchaser for value from the apparent legal owner took free of the claims of equitably adopted
children because their interests were not apparent from the record).
72. See Patty v. Middleton, 17 S.W. 909, 912 (Tex. 1891) (acknowledging the heirs of the
deceased wife acquired her equitable interest, but concluding such interest could not prevail over an
innocent purchaser from the husband). As one court stated:
It is thoroughly settled by the decisions of this court that, when land belonging to the
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"shall" recording statute will not protect the innocent purchaser, 7 3 and
the old common law
absent the equitable doctrine of innocent purchaser,
74
apply.
will
right
in
first
rule of first in time,
III.
A.

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF VOID INSTRUMENTS OR VOIDABLE
INSTRUMENTS IN ONE'S CHAIN OF TITLE

The Foged Deed vs. Deeds Procured Through Fraud

The Texas law dealing with a forged deed in one's chain of title has
been uniform and unwavering.7" As stated by the Texas Supreme Court:
community of husband and wife is deeded to both, each has legal title to it, but, when the
conveyance is made to one only, the legal title is vested in that one, and the other has an
equitable title. Such deed does not constitute notice to subsequent purchasers for value without
notice of the community interest of the unnamed member.
....Beyond cavil, [the innocent purchaser] acquired the legal and equitable title to the land
by his purchase from Lytle, who had the legal title, and [the innocent purchaser] had no notice
of the equity of the former wife or her children.
Mitchell v. Schofield, 171 S.W. 1121, 1122 (Tex. 1915).
73. Under the "shall" recording statute, equitable interests or titles reflected by an unrecorded
writing are not rendered void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for value so long as such
interests or titles are not a conveyance, a mortgage, or deed of trust; rather, the doctrine of estoppel
protects subsequent creditors and purchasers for value against the assertion of such equitable titles.
See Fed. Life Ins., 157 S.W.2d at 152 (concluding the equitable title owners were estopped from
claiming superior rights in the land as against good faith creditors or innocent purchasers for value
to remain in" their grantor); see also Johnson v.
because the appellees "suffered the naked legal title
Darr, 272 S.W. 1098, 1100-01 (Tex. 1925) (stating estoppel cannot be asserted by a judgment lien
creditor as he has not parted with valuable consideration, and concluding an attachment lien creditor
can derive no greater interest than the debtor's interest and if that interest is bare legal title, the
judgment creditor will be defeated by the equitable title owner).
74. See Olds, supra note 42, at 48 (proclaiming the recording act does apply if one "acquires the
legal title as against earlier equitable interests where one or both of the interests are not within the
recording act" and in such a situation, the circumstance that is not covered "leaves the preceding
common law rules in force" with the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchaser able to "aid" the
individual who acquired legal tile).
75. Simply put, one cannot be a bona fide purchaser for value if a forged deed is in one's chain
of title. See Pure Oil Co. v. Swindall, 58 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved,
judgrn't affirmed) (asserting one cannot be an innocent purchaser if one link in that purchaser's chain
of title was a forged instrument); see also Dyson Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Expl. Co., 861 S.W.2d
942, 947 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) ("No person can be an innocent purchaser
of land where one of the links in the chain of title is a forgery." (first citing Swindall 58 S.W.2d at 10;
and then citing Bellaire Kirkpatrick Joint Venture v. Loots, 826 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1992, writ denied))); Bellaire Kirkpaftick, 826 S.W.2d at 209 (denying a party innocent purchaser
protection since, "by definition, [one] cannot be a bonafide purchaser" with a forged deed in one's
chain of title); Erwin v. Curtis, 5 S.W.2d 547, 548-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1928, writ reF'd)
(observing the innocent purchaser rule is inapplicable when one's "claim is dependent upon a forged
instrument"). A forged deed is considered void per se for two interrelated reasons: (1) as the forger
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The difference between the tide carried by a patent issued upon a
forged assignment of the certificate and that resting upon a forged deed in
the chain of transfer, as affecting the defense of an innocent purchaser, is
apparent. A forged deed is an absolute nullity; a purchaser under it acquires
no tide; and it therefore affords no foundation for the defense. In the
former case, . . . the patent is not a nullity,
but passes the legal tide to the
76
patentee and those holding under him.
It is a well-recognized legal principle that a grantor cannot convey to a
grantee a greater or better tide than that which the grantor holds.7 7 Thus,
because a forger does not have legal or equitable tide, the forger's grantee
will receive no interest in the property purported to be conveyed.7 8
Accordingly, the initial grantee, receiving no ownership of the legal tide,
cannot be an innocent purchaser. 7 9 As the original grantee does not
receive legal tide, a subsequent purchaser in this chain can never acquire
legal title from her grantor and, therefore, cannot qualify as an innocent
80
purchaser.
The proper recording of a deed in the proper county gives constructive
notice of the recorded deed's existence to all persons.8 1 Such notice of
the recording is a conclusive presumption of the law.8 2 But this is not the
case with the recording of a forged deed.8 3 Texas courts have held "[a]

had no interest to convey, "the forged document cannot pass a property interest"; and (2) the person
whose signature was forged cannot protect himself from the forgery and, thus, "is innocent while the
defrauded person had a hand in her own misfortune." Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of
Instability:Markets, Predation, RacaliZed Geography, and ProperyLaw, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 884 (2011).
76. Hennessy v. Blair, 173 S.W. 871, 874 (Tex. 1915).
77. See Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex. 1978) (concluding the grantor was unable to
transfer an interest greater than he possessed).
78. See Hennesgy, 173 S.W. at 874 (noting "[a]forged deed is an absolute nullity" and thus, a
purchaser under such deed acquires no title and has no foundation for the innocent purchaser
defense); Janes v. Stratton, 203 S.W. 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918, no writ) (holding a
forged deed conveys no interest in property).
79. See, e.g., York's Adm'r v. McNutt, 16 Tex. 13, 16 (1856) (stating the protection afforded to
innocent purchasers only applies when one acquires the legal title through purchase and without
notice).
80. See Swindall, 58 S.W.2d at 10 (affirming when one of the links in a chain of title is a forged
deed a subsequent purchaser cannot be an innocent purchaser).
81. TEx. PROP. CODE § 13.002(1) (West 2016).
82. See White v. McGregor, 50 S.W. 564, 566 (Tex. 1899) ("The effect of the statute of
registration is to create a legal, irrebuttable presumption on part of subsequent purchasers that they
know of the existence of the duly-recorded deed."); Quarles v. Hardin, 249 S.W. 459, 462 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't affirmed) (emphasizing constructive notice provides such a violent and
conclusive presumption that no court will allow it to be controverted (citations omitted)).
83. See Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 889 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Vex. App.Houston 14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (emphasizing recording a forged deed does not give it any
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forged deed is void ab initio"; 84 thus, the recording of a forged deed
neither constitutes constructive notice to any subsequent purchasers nor
validates the forged deed.8 5 A court of civil appeals explained the bases
for these propositions as follows:
This case must be considered exactly as though no deed from Scott and
wife was upon record, and appellant occupies the same position that it
would have occupied had the forged deed not been recorded. That
instrument was a nullity, and its record could not and did not give it vitality.
The forged deed could not affect the title to the land, and was therefore not
entitled to record. The provisions of the statutes as to deeds being void as
to subsequent purchasers, without notice, if not recorded, have no
application to forged deeds. Reliance on a recorded forged deed may bring
loss on him who so relies, but it cannot affect the rights of the owner of the
property. A man cannot be deprived of his property by a forged deed, no
matter in what good faith the party acted who claims under it. The forged
is as absolutely void and ineffective as though it had never
instrument
86
existed.

However, notwithstanding that a forged deed is a nullity and void ab initio,
it is clear that a grantee or his successors under a forged deed can gain
limitation title to the property under two of Texas's adverse possession
legal effect as it lacks effectiveness ab initio); seealso Hennesg, 173 S.W. at 874 (differentiating forged
deeds in the chain of ride from other forged instruments because a forgery renders a deed null and
deprives subsequent purchasers of the innocent purchaser defense).
84. Dyson Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Expl. Co., 861 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. App-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (citations omitted); see also Hennesgy, 173 S.W. at 874 (indicating "[a] forged
deed is an absolute nullity" and affords no legal tide thereby depriving subsequent purchasers of the
innocent purchaser defense). One court succinctly stated the law in Texas concerning a forged deed
in one's chain of title in the following way:
A forged deed is void ab initio and inoperative. Tide to land cannot pass under a forged
deed. The fact that the grantee and his assigns are innocent purchasers makes no difference
because no person can be an innocent purchaser of land where there is a forgery in the chain of
tide. A forged deed lacks effectiveness ab initio and neither consent, waiver, estoppel,
implications, delivery, nor recording can give any legal effect to sucltan instrument.
Commonwealth Land Title, 889 S.W.2d at 318 (citations omitted).
85. See Dyson Descendant Cop., 861 S.W.2d at 947 (concluding "[t]he recording of a forged deed
does not give it any vitality" or afford constructive notice of the deed's existence); Bibby v. Bibby,
114 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1938, writ dism'd) (considering forged deeds
ineffective for all purposes even if they are recorded (citations omitted)); Abee v. Bargas, 65 S.W.
489, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1901, no writ) ("A forged deed is not entided to record, and
if such a deed is recorded it cannot affect title to the land." (citations omitted)).
86. Alamo Tr. Co. v. Cunningham, 203 S.W. 413, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, writ
dism'd w.o.j.) (citations omitted).
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Texas courts have drawn different legal conclusions concerning the
effect of deeds that were forged from those deeds procured by fraud.8 8
The Texas Supreme Court has held deeds obtained by fraud are voidable
and not void 8 9 and can be set aside at the election of the individual who is
defrauded.9 ° The difference in treatment is generally considered to rest
upon the culpability of the parties involved.9 1 An individual whose

87. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE 5 16.026, .028 (West 2016) (detailing the ten-year and
twenty-five-year statutes for adverse possession with a recorded instrument, but limiting the acreage
that may be adversely possessed in the absence of a title instrument under the ten-year statute for
adverse possession). In Moses v. Dibrell,the court stated:
It is contended by plaintiffs that a forged deed, or a deed under a forged power of attorney,
will not support the plea of limitation. This is true as to the 5-years statute of limitations, as
expressly provided by statute, but the statute does not reach the case under the plea of 10[]yearsU limitation. It seems reasonable that, as the statute specially refers to the bar by 5[]years0 limitation without including the 10-years limitation, it was intended to exclude the claim
by the 10-years, and that the statutory rule would not apply to the latter.
Moses v. Dibrell, 21 S.W. 414, 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1893, no writ) (citations omitted); see also
Wilhite v. Davis, 298 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, no writ) (concluding the parties
could acquire limitation title under the five-, ten-, and twenty- five-year adverse possessions statutes
even though their deed was a forgery and void). The five-year statute of limitations specifically
states, "This section does not apply to a claim based on a forged deed or a deed executed under a
forged power of attorney." Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 16.025(b).
88. Compare Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)
("Deeds obtained by fraud are voidable rather than void, and remain effective until set side." (citing
Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. 1976))), with Hennessy, 173 S.W. at 874 ("A forged deed
is an absolute nullity ... ").
89. Ford,235 S.W.3d at 618 (citing Nobles, 533 S.W.2d at 926). One court succinctly pointed out
the difference in effect between void and voidable deeds in the following language:
The primary distinction we find between void and voidable deeds in Texas law is with respect
to the rights of an innocent purchaser. A voidable deed operates as valid and perfect until set
aside. Such a deed may be voidable as between grantor and grantee; it may nevertheless be
effectual to convey tile to an innocent purchaser from the grantee. A deed which is void,
however, cannot pass title even to an innocent purchaser from the grantee.
Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Tex. Bank, 889 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (citations omitted).
90. See Deaton v. Rush, 252 S.W. 1025, 1031 (Tex. 1923) (acknowledging a defrauded property
owner can file an action to cancel the deed obtained by fraud (citing Cook v. Moore, 39 Tex. 255,
260 (1873))); Lighthouse Church, 889 S.W.2d at 602 (stressing voidable deeds are valid until set aside by
the one defrauded); see also Nobles, 533 S.W.2d at 926 (reiterating deeds obtained by fraud are "prima
facie evidence of tile until there has been a successful suit to set it aside" (first citing Meiners v. Tex.
Osage Coop. Royalty Pool, Inc., 309 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1958, writ refd
n.r.e.); and then citing Whalen v. Richardson, 353 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962,
no writ))).
91. See McFarlane, supra note 75 (distinguishing between a person whose signature is forged and
cannot adequately protect against the forgery and a defrauded party who can investigate or seek legal
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signature is forged is generally unaware of the forgery and, thus, is
considered innocent and incapable of protecting herself; whereas the
92
The
defrauded person participated and created his own misfortune.
a
voidable
aside
residual four-year statute of limitations applies to setting
deed as the equitable powers of the court must be invoked to cancel the
93
In giving the
deed before maintaining an action to recover the land.
said:
Appeals
of
Court
Dallas
the
approach,
for
this
rationale
Hence, as a voidable deed, it effectually accomplishes the thing sought to be
accomplished, until set aside in a suit for rescission or cancellation. Such a
deed prima facie conveys the title to the land, and, where the recovery of the
tide necessarily follows the rescission or cancellation of the deed, the action
brought thereon is not, strictly speaking, a suit to recover real estate. The
recovery of the land could not be obtained until the deed was canceled; the
judgment for the land would be the consequence of the relief primarily
granted, and could not, but for that relief, be recovered. 9 4
Unlike the case of a forged instrument, the innocent purchaser rule
applies to protect subsequent purchasers in the case of a deed obtained by
fraud. 9 5 The legal reasoning for permitting the innocent purchaser rule to

advice to guard against the fraud).
92. See id. (contending "the defrauded person hals] a hand in her own misfortune" by giving
consent even if it was fraudulently obtained, and comparing this to the "innocent" victim of forgery).
The Texas Supreme Court explained:
I'X'here the owner of real property negligently clothes another with the apparent title to it,
although the execution of the instrument which purports to convey the title may be obtained by
fraud, and third parties being misled thereby innocently purchase and pay value for the
property, [the owner] should be held estopped to deny the validity of the conveyance.
Link v. Page, 10 S.W. 699, 701 (T'ex. 1889).
93. See, e.g., Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 618 (declaring deeds obtained by fraud voidable unless such
deed was cancelled and set aside before limitations expired under the residual [imitation statute
(citations omitted)). The residual statute of limitations that applies in cases to reform, cancel, or
rescind a deed or an equitable action to remove a cloud when the deed is voidable provides: "Every
action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for the recovery of real
property, must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues." TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE 5 16.051 (West 2016).
94. Neill v. Pure Oil Co., 101 S.W.2d 402, 404 ('ex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, writ ref'd)
(citations omitted); see also Deaton, 252 S.W. at 1031 (agreeing when a vendee acquired a deed by fraud
his "title Iwals prima facie good[] and it could only be avoided by a suit and a decree annulling and
canceling the deed" (citing Cook, 39 Tex. at 260-61)).
95. See link, 10 S.W. at 701 (providing where an instrument purporting to convey title is
obtained by fraud, a subsequent innocent purchaser will be protected under principles of estoppel);
seealso Nobles, 533 S.W.2d at 926 (explaining a deed procured by fraud represented prima facie title
until set aside (first citing Meiners, 309 S.W.2d at 902; and then citing Whalen, 353 S.W.2d at 943)).
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apply in such cases was explained as follows:
The doctrine of innocent purchaser grows out of the idea that a court
of equity will not grant relief against an innocent party where the plaintiff
has placed in the hands of another the apparent power to cause the said
party to act to his detriment, and that where one of two innocent parties is
to suffer, then the one who has placed in the hands of another the means by
which a wrong is done must be the one to suffer. We assume that the
execution and delivery of the instrument, dated February 22, 1924, was
procured through fraud. So assuming, such an instrument so executed and
delivered, in the absence of notice of the circumstances under which its
execution and delivery was procured, apparently was fair on its face, and
therefore not void, though subject to be declared so by a court of competent
jurisdiction under proper pleadings and due proof. In other words, such an
instrument so executed, as between the parties, was voidable, and was not
void, even between the parties. Furthermore, until such an instrument has
been declared to be void, in an authoritative manner, persons who are
ignorant of the circumstances under which the instrument was executed and
96
delivered are entitled to consider it genuine.

Thus, while a deed procured by fraud by the initial grantee is voidable, if
the initial grantee conveys the property to a subsequent innocent purchaser
without notice for value, the initial grantor will be unable to set aside the
97
interest of the innocent purchaser.
96. Pure Oil Co. v. Swindall, 58 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved,
judgm't affirmed).
97. See, e.g.,Ramirez v. Bell, 298 S.W. 924, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1927, writ ref'd)
(indicating the maker of an instrument procured by fraud cannot assert such fraud against an
innocent purchaser). While this part of the Article deals with deeds procured by fraud, the same
rules apply to other voidable deeds; deeds procured by undue influence, mutual mistake, or duress
are also voidable. See Beville v. Jones, 11 S.W. 1128, 1130 (Tex. 1889) (ruling a deed procured by
undue influence may be set aside); Spain v. Fuston, 242 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1951, no writ) (asserting a deed may be cancelled on proof of mutual mistake); Kinnear v.
Tolbert, 262 S.W. 900, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1924, writ dism'd w.o.j.) ("A deed obtained
by duress is voidable only and not void .... "). In these cases, the courts have also acknowledged
that an innocent purchaser will prevail. See Slay v. Wheeler, 84 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1935, writ ref'd) (warning a voidable deed may not be rescinded following a transfer to a
bona fide purchaser). Thus, in Slay v. Wheeler, the court recognized the rights of an innocent
purchaser with a voidable deed in his chain of title are determined by this rule of law:
"Though a deed or mortgage may have been procured by means of fraud or false
representationsl or by duress or undue influence, or without consideration so as to make it
voidable at the instance of the grantor, yet it cannot be rescinded or canceled after the property
has been transferred to a bona fide purchaser for valueU who takes[] without knowledge of, or
participation in[] the fraud or other invalidating circumstance."
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Void Deeds in a Subsequent Purchaser'sChain of Title9 8

To determine whether a deed is voidable or void the courts examine the
deed's effect upon the tide at the time of its execution and delivery. 9 9 A
void deed "is without vitality or legal effect."' 0 0 A voidable deed, on the
other hand, "operates to accomplish the thing sought to be accomplished,
until the fatal vice in the transaction has been judicially ascertained and
Following the logic used in forgery cases, 10 2 Texas courts
declared."' '
have held the recording of a void deed is not constructive notice to
creditors and subsequent purchasers.10 3 Furthermore, Texas courts have
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 3 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE RESCISSION
OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 640, at 1547 Gay M. Lee ed.,
2d ed. 1929)).
98. This section of the Article deals specifically with those situations where the courts have held
a subsequent purchaser can be deemed an innocent purchaser for value in spite of the existence of a
void deed in such purchaser's chain of title. E.g., Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock,
141 S.W.2d 1030, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) (deeming the
subsequent purchasers following a void foreclosure sale to be innocent purchasers despite the
existence of a void deed in their chain of titie because they had paid valuable consideration for the
title and had no notice the foreclosure sale was void).
99. Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. 1942). The Slaughter court needed to
determine whether the particular deed involved in the case was void or voidable to ascertain whether
limitations had run. Id. The court noted:
The rule has long been established in this [s]tate that where a deed is absolutely void, a suit at
law in trespass to try tide may be maintained to recover the land without setting the deed aside,
and the statutes of limitation governing actions for the recovery of land apply. On the other
hand, where a deed is merely voidable and the equity powers of the court must first be invoked
to cancel the deed before a suit can be maintained at law to recover the land, then the four-year
statutefl controls.
Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. (quoting Smith v. Thornhill, 25 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930), vacated on
othergrounds on reh , 34 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved, judgm't adopted)).
101. Id. (quoting Smith, 25 S.W.2d at 598).
102. See Abee v. Bargas, 65 S.W. 489, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1901, no writ)
(indicating forged deeds are not entitled to be filed for record, and if it is recorded, the forged deed
"cannot affect tide to the land"); McFarlane, supra note 75 ("[A] forger[y victim] cannot protect him
or herself from the forgery and is innocent .... ).
103. See Stiles v. Japhet, 19 S.W. 450, 452 (Tex. 1892) (per curiam) (concluding recording a void
deed conveys no actual or constructive notice); Terry v. Cutler, 39 S.W. 152, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1896, writ ref'd) (affirming that the recording of a void deed conveys no notice of its contents
(citations omitted)).
Texas courts have also held recording a deed with a defective acknowledgment is not
constructive notice to future purchasers since the instrument was not entitled to recordation. See
Gulf Prod. Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 164 S.W.2d 488, 494 (Tex. 1942) (recognizing the recording of an
instrument with a defective acknowledgment does not impart constructive notice to subsequent
purchasers where the defect appears on the face of the instrument (citations omitted)); Taylor v.
Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 458 (1877) (indicating when the acknowledgment is left off the recorded
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consistently held a void deed does not convey legal title to the grantee'
and one holding under a void deed is not an innocent purchaser for
value.1 0 5 Nevertheless, in spite of such unequivocal language, Texas
courts 6 have, from time to time, announced exceptions to these rules of

law.

0

instrument, the instrument was not properly recorded and creditors and subsequent purchasers were
not charged with notice). However, this rule is only true when the defect in the acknowledgment is
on the face of the certificate. See, e.g.,Guf Prod. Co., 164 S.W.2d at 494 (determining that if the
recorded instrument disclosed the defect in the acknowledgment, subsequent purchasers would not
have constructive notice). Thus, in the situation where the notary's certificate appears regular on its
face, the recording of the instrument does give constructive notice. See id at 493 (noting if a notary's
certificate were regular on its face with no evidence of any defect, subsequent purchasers would be
charged with constructive notice of the recorded instrument); Titus v. Johnson, 50 Tex. 224, 240
(1878) (stating where the defect in an acknowledgment did not appear on the face of the certificate,
the recorded instrument provided constructive notice and parol evidence was not admissible to
establish that the certificate was not proper). Of course, "as between a grantor and a grantee deeds
are valid even without a valid acknowledgment." Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916, 928 (Tex.
1967) (citations omitted).
104. See Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1908, writ ref'd)
(holding a deed executed by the agent and attorney of the grantor did not convey title to the grantee
because the grantor was dead at the time of the execution and, therefore, the agent had no authority
to execute the deed); Tery, 39 S.W. at 156 (deeming a sheriffs deed null and void since "the sheriff
was without power to make the sale" and, therefore, his deed conveyed no tide).
105. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex. 2013)
(indicating one cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser when a void deed is in one's chain of tide
(quoting Wall, 118 S.W. at 888)), irv City of Edinburg v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010); Wall, 118 S.W. at 888 (asserting a person claiming under a void
title could not be an innocent purchaser, and thus asserting the conveyance at hand was void since
the owner of the property was dead at the time of its execution (first citing Daniels v. Mason, 38 S.W.
161, 162 (Tex. 1896); and then citing Tery, 39 S.W. at 156)). The Wall court relied in part on the
earlier case of Daniels v. Mason where the court said:
The proposition is that a bona fide purchaser for value from the holder of the legal tide with no
capacity to contract will be protected against the subsequent claims of such vendor or his heirs,
seeking to avoid the binding force of such contract by reason of such want of capacity, on the
ground that such purchaser had no notice of such want of capacity. We know of no instance in
which such protection has ever been extended.... In the case before us the legal title was in
[the deceased wife of the defendant], but during coverture, in the absence of special
circumstances, not shown to have existed, she was without capacity to convey, whether the land
be considered community or her separate estate; and the rules of equity, established for the
protection of bona fide purchasers against secret or undisclosed equities in the thing conveyed,
afford purchasers from her, and those claiming under them, no protection against the
consequences of such want of capacity, though they were ignorant thereof.
Daniels,38 S.W. at 162.
106. See Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 141 S.W.2d 1030, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) ("[It has long been the law in this state that one who
purchases land from another who has the apparent title, without notice of any infirmities therein, and
pays a valuable consideration therefor, is protected under the equitable doctrine of innocent
purchaser." (citing Mast v. Tibbles, 60 Tex. 301, 305 (1883))).
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1. Deeds Considered Void Because of the Failure to Comply
with Statutes Relating to Conveyances by Married Women
Prior to August 23, 1963, a married woman had to be joined by her
husband in a conveyance of her separate property.1 °7 Furthermore, until
January 1, 1968,1"8 for a married woman to join her husband in a
conveyance of real property she had to have her acknowledgment to the
conveyance "privily and apart from her husband."10 9
The courts
107. The statute requiring the joinder provided:
The husband and wife shall join in the conveyance of real estate, the separate property of the
wife; and no such conveyance shall take effect until the same shall have been acknowledged by
her privily and apart from her husband before some officer authorized by law to take
acknowledgments to deeds for the purpose of being recorded, and certified to in the mode
pointed out in articles 6605 and 6608.
Act effective Sept. 1, 1925, 39th Leg., R.S., tit. 31, art. 1299,piintedin 1 Revised Civil Statutes of the State
of Texas, at 389, 391 (Austin, A. C. Baldwin & Sons 1925), repealed by Act approved June 10, 1963,
58th Leg., R.S., ch. 473, 5 1, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1189, 1189 (effective Aug. 23, 1963).
108. See Allen v. Monk, 505 S.W.2d 523, 524-25 (rex. 1974) (acknowledging the repeal,
effective January 1, 1968, of the promulgated form of a married woman's acknowledgment and the
statute setting out the requirements of the privily examination).
109. See, e.g.,Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Downey, 183 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. 1944) (recognizing
that since 1841 a privy examination and an acknowledgment were essential to the validity of a
conveyance of a married woman's separate property (citations omitted)). A later supreme court
stated the reason for the requirement of the separate acknowledgment was to protect a married
woman from "careless divestment" of her separate property. Coakley v. Reising, 436 S.W.2d 315,
319 (Tex. 1968) (citations omitted). The statute requiring the privily examination stated:
No acknowledgment of a married woman to any conveyance or other instrument purporting to
be executed by her shall be taken, unless she has had the same shown to her, and then and there
fully explained by the officer taking the acknowledgment on an examination privily and apart
from her husband; nor shall he certify to the same, unless she thereupon acknowledges to such
officer that the same is her act and deed, that she has willingly signed the same, and that she
wishes not to retract it.
Act effective Sept. 1, 1925, 39th Leg., R.S., tit. 115, ch. 2, art. 6605,piintedin 2 Revised Civil Statutes of
the State of Texas, at 1881, 1884 (Austin, A. C. Baldwin & Sons 1925), repealed by Act approved May 27,
1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 309, § 6, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 735, 741 (effective Jan. 1, 1968). The
certificate of acknowledgment of a married woman had to be substantially in compliance with the
following promulgated form:
The State of
.,
County of__
Before me,
(here insert the name and character of officer) on this day
personally appeared
, wife of _
_
known to me (or proved to on me
on the oath of
_)to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing
instrument, and having been examined by me privily and apart from her husband, and having
the same fully explained to her, she, the said
, acknowledged such
instrument to be her act and deed, and declared that she had willingly signed the same for the
purposes and consideration therein expressed, and that she did not wish to retract it.

2016]

TIME TO REPAIR THE CHArN

unequivocally held the failure to comply with these statutes made the
conveyance void, to be treated as a nullity. 110 However, the courts
engrafted two equitable exceptions to this absolute rule of law to protect
innocent purchasers. 1 1
First, the courts held a married woman could be estopped from
recovering her separate property or claiming title in cases where 1her
12
fraudulent misrepresentations were relied on by an innocent purchaser.
(Seal) "Given under my hand and seal of office this _

day of

__

, A. D.,

__

6608,printedin 2 Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, at 1881, 1884 (Austin, A.
Id. tit.
115, ch. 2, art.
C. Baldwin & Sons 1925), repealed by Act approved May 27, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 309, § 6,
1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 735, 741.
110. See Downy, 183 S.W.2d at 428 (holding a married woman's failure to comply with the
separate acknowledgment rendered the instrument conveying her separate property an absolute
nullity (citations omitted)); Veeder v. Gilmer, 129 S.W. 595, 596 (rex. 1910) (noting compliance with
the statutes' privy and acknowledgment requirements was absolutely essential to passing tide of a
married woman's separate real property); Chester v. Breitling, 32 S.W. 527, 527 (Tex. 1895) (deeming
a deed executed by a married woman void because the officer "failed to certify to the privy
examination and acknowledgment" as required by statute); Williams v. Ellingsworth, 12 S.W. 746,
747 (Tex. 1889) (concluding a deed executed by a married woman that purported to convey her
for failure to comply with the statutes). In Bery v.
separate property was ineffective to pass title
Donley, the court explained the importance of the privy examination and indicated American courts
give statutes similar to Texas's the following "general if not universal construction":
to her lands except by a deed executed upon her private
"A feme covert cannot convey a title
examination, made as the law directs; her signature to a deed without such private examination is a
nullity; her deeds of all kinds are void without such examination; it is the examination which
gives them validity, and not the signature; the signature being a nullity without such
till such examination
examination. It then necessarily follows that there is no divesture of title
be had," etc.
Berry v. Donley, 26 Tex. 737, 745-46 (1893) (quoting Perry v. Calhoun, 27 Tenn. 551, 556 (1847));
see also Buvens v. Brown, 18 S.W.2d 1057, 1061 (Tex. 1929) (acknowledging the courts sometimes
referred to deeds not properly acknowledged by a married woman as being no deeds at all or a "mere
waste paper" (quoting Cross v. Everts, 28 Tex. 523, 532 (1866))).
111. See Downey, 183 S.W.2d at 428 (providing protection to innocent purchasers for value, in
certain situations, if they did not have notice of the officer's failure to perform "his duty in taking the
acknowledgment" of the married woman appearing before him); Berry, 26 Tex. at 746 (suggesting
relief would be denied to a married woman who made fraudulent misrepresentations upon which
another acted or was misled).
Bery, 26 Tex. at 746 (indicating a married woman may be estopped from
112. See, e.g.,
recovering her separate property as a result of her fraudulent acts or misrepresentations relied upon
by others). An early Texas Supreme Court set forth this explanation of the estoppel principle:
While [the law] extends its protection to the rights of a married woman, it does not permit her
"[T]he law protects her, but it gives
to act fraudulently or inequitably to the injury of others ....
her no license to commit a fraud against the rights of an innocent party."
acting on her own responsibility, may act fraudulently, deceitfully, or inequitably,
Afeme covert,
so as to deprive her of any claim for relief in a court of equity. This results from the capacity to
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In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Downey,1 13 the court stated:
The only instances in which a married woman can be prevented from
asserting the invalidity of a deed not separately acknowledged as required by
our statutes is where she has been guilty of such active fraud in regard to the
transaction as would estop her from pleading the invalidity of her
11 4
acknowledgment or the certificate thereto.
The Downey court also announced another exception noting that the
certificate of the officer taking the acknowledgment could be conclusive in
certain cases, thereby protecting an innocent purchaser.' 1 5 This exception
to the general rule of law was clearly articulated in Wheelock v. Cavit 11 6 in
the following words:
Under the facts alleged in the plaintiffs petition as shown in the
statement accompanying the question, the certificate of the officer showing
that the plaintiff had acknowledged the deed in question was void; and,
notwithstanding the vendee may have paid value for the land without notice
that the certificate was in fact false, no tide passed by the conveyance. In
hold property and make contracts, with which the law invests her. Her voluntary acts and
representations made to deceive and which do deceive others to their prejudice, will be binding
upon her. If she makes admissions and representations in respect to her rights of property by
which others are deceived and induced to give credit to her husband on the faith of the
property, she will be precluded from asserting her claim against the rights of those who have
confided in and acted upon her representations and admissions. ["]Indeed,"... in treating of
fraudulent concealments and representations, "cases of this sort are viewed with so much
disfavor by courts of equity that neither infancy nor coverture will constitute any excuse for the
party guilty of the concealment or misrepresentation, for neither infants nor femes coverts are
privileged to practice deceptions or cheats on other innocent persons."
It is a well-settled principle of the law, from the influence of which not even married women
are exempted, that "admissions which have been acted upon by others are conclusive against
the party making them in all cases between him and the person whose conduct he has thus
influenced." "The party is estopped, on grounds of public policy and good faith, from
repudiating his own representations."
Cravens v. Booth, 8 Tex. 243, 248-49 (1852) (citations omitted).
113. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Downey, 183 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1944).
114. Id. at 428 (citing Johnson v. Bryan, 62 Tex. 623, 625 (1884)); see also Hussey v. Moser,
7 S.W. 606, 608 (Tex. 1888) (stating, by way of obiter dicta, that a married woman who concealed
facts that her daughter had signed and acknowledged her name to a deed giving it the appearance of
a valid conveyance had a "duty to denounce the fraud" and might be estopped for the protection of
innocent third parties).
115. See Downy, 183 S.W.2d at 428 (asserting an innocent purchaser would be protected where
the married woman appeared for the purposes of acknowledging the instrument and the certificate of
acknowledgment complied with the statutes except the officer failed to perform his legal duty to take
the acknowledgment).
116. Wheelock v. Cavitt, 45 S.W. 796 (Tex. 1898).
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this state the rule is firmly established that where a married woman, who has,
with her husband, signed a deed conveying her separate real estate, appears
before an officer authorized by law, for the purpose of acknowledging the
conveyance, and the officer fails to do his duty in taking such
acknowledgment, but makes a certificate which shows a full compliance with
the law, such certificate is conclusive upon the married woman in favor of an
innocent vendee who paid value for it without notice that the officer failed
to perform his duty as required by law.... But where it is shown that the
married woman has not appeared before the officer for the purpose of
acknowledging the execution of the deed, and no acknowledgment has been
in fact made, she having in no way invoked the exercise of the officer's
authority in that respect, the certificate, however formal, is not binding upon
1 17
her, even in favor of an innocent purchaser for value and without notice.
The courts also used equitable principles in those situations where the
earlier instrument was void because the requirements of the statute had
not been complied with; thus, a new instrument that was properly
acknowledged and accompanied by a proper certificate could ratify the
and become effective on the date of
lawful terms of the earlier document
11 8
the new instrument's execution.
117. Id. at 797 (citations omitted).
118. The court in Montgome9 v. Hornbergerstated:
It may be true, as contended by [the heirs of the grantor], that the deed of 1845 was void
because it was not acknowledged by Mrs. Sawyer[, the grantor]. It is also true that, being a
nullity, it could not be confirmed by the subsequent deed, so as to have any validity of its own.
The attempt to confirm it could not change the fact that the tide had not previously passed out
of Mrs. Sawyer, or, retroactively, impart to the nullity an efficacy which it had not before
possessed. But at the date of the second instrument, Mrs. Sawyer was still the owner of the
land, and had capacity to convey it by complying with the law. An attempt to confirm a void
deed, so as to make it operative, may fail to effect that purpose, but may still operate as a new
grant. In some of the authorities it is said that such effect may be given to the deed of
confirmation if apt words to convey the tide in prrsenti are employed. In order that the deed
shall so operate, we think it is only essential that the intention to convey should appear, and
such intention could hardly be more effectually expressed than by saying that a deed by which
the party had undertaken to convey the land at a past time shall operate from such date. As
surely as the greater includes the less, and the whole all of its parts, the expression of an
intention to make a deed operate for all time from a past date includes the intent that it shall
operate from the present. So the objection urged by [the grantor's heirs], that the confirming
deed does not expressly purport by its own terms to convey the title, cannot be sustained.
Besides, the true view of the matter, as before stated, in the instrument last signed by [Mr.]
Sawyer and [his] wife, is not the whole of the deed. By its reference to the attached document[,
the void deed,] it imparted into, and made part of itself, the terms of that paper, which supplied
everything essential to a complete conveyance.
Montgomery v. Hornberger, 40 S.W. 628, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1897, writ ref'd) (citations
omitted); see alrso Thompson v. Crim, 126 S.W.2d 18, 20 (ex. 1939) (noting a married woman's
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However, in situations where the certificate of acknowledgment was
insufficient on its face, although the acknowledgment was properly taken
pursuant to the terms of the statute, courts held the deed was inoperative
as a conveyance but was not void.1 1 9 In such a case, the certificate of
acknowledgment could be corrected pursuant to an action in court, as
provided by statute, within four years after the execution of the
instrument.1 20 Furthermore, such certificate could be corrected by the
ratification of an earlier void deed, which regards her separate property, must clearly and
unequivocally reflect an intent to ratify and confirm the earlier instrument); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Clark, 87 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex. 1935) (clarifying that although the original mineral lease was void for
failure to comply with the statutes concerning the conveyance of a married woman's separate
property, its lawful terms could be adopted in a new lease that became effective upon execution).
119. See Hill v. Foster, 186 S.W.2d 343, 345 (rex. 1945) (determining where a married woman
properly acknowledged the deed, but the officer failed to attach the proper certificate of
acknowledgment, "the deed was not void but merely inoperative as a conveyance"); Interstate Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Goforth, 59 S.W. 871, 873 (rex. 1900) (deciding if a deed was properly
acknowledged, but a proper certificate was not attached, the deed was not void).
120. See Foster, 186 S.W.2d at 345-46 (asserting a defective certificate of acknowledgment could
be corrected by an action, as permitted by statute, to have it conform to the actual facts); Gofortb,
59 S.W. at 873 (noting an action to correct the certificate could be brought within four years from the
making of the instrument). The statute authorizing the correction of the certificate by an action, as
referred to by the Hill v. Foster court, stated: "When the acknowledgment or proof of the execution of
any instrument in writing may be properly made, but defectively certified, any party interested may
have an action in the district court to obtain a judgment correcting the certificate." Act effective
Sept. 1, 1925, 39th Leg., R.S., tit. 115, ch. 5, art. 6655, printed in 2 Revised Civil Statutes of the State of
Texas, at 1881, 1895 (Austin, A. C. Baldwin & Sons 1925), repealed and codified by Act of May 30, 1983,
68th Leg., R.S., ch. 576, § 6, 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475, 3729-30, 3488 (adopting nonsubstantive
revisions of statutes relating to property into the Property Code) (current version at TEX. PROP.
CODE§ 11.005(b)).
An action to correct the certificate is covered by the four-year residual statute of limitations. See
TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE 16.051 (West 2016) (requiring every action, other than an action to
recover real property, to be brought within four years from the date it accrues if no specific limitation
period exists); see also Norton v. Davis, 18 S.W. 430, 431 (Tex. 1892) (per curiam) (indicating an
action to correct a certificate of acknowledgment of a married woman was barred by the four-year
statute). Until a statute authorizing a correction of the certificate of acknowledgment came about,
the certificate was the only evidence, and where it did not satisfy the requirements of the law, the
deed failed. See, e.g., Looney v. Adamson, 48 Tex. 619, 621-22 (1878) (concluding a deed was
incomplete since the certificate of acknowledgment was silent as to the acknowledgment and privily
examination by a married woman, and a married woman's voluntary execution of a deed could not be
established by parol evidence). The first statute authorizing an action to obtain a judgment
correcting the certificate came into existence in 1879. See Act of Feb. 21, 1879, 16th Leg., R.S.,
tit. LXXXVI, ch. 5, art. 4353,pintedin The Revised Statutes of Texas, at 620, 628 (Galveston, A. H. Belo
& Co. 1879) (current version at PROP. § 11.005(b)) ("When the acknowledgment or proof of the
execution of any instrument in writing may be properly made, but defectively certified, any party
interest may have an action in the district court to obtain a judgment correcting the certificate."). In
explaining the purpose of the correction statute, the supreme court stated:
The only change the statute makes is to permit the facts which actually existed and ought to
have been stated in, but were omitted from, the certificate to be established and evidenced by
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execution of another instrument recognizing the validity of the prior
instrument. 1 21

However, unless the certificate was corrected by court

order or the execution of another proper instrument, the recorded
to give notice to a subsequent purchaser from
instrument was not effective
122
the original grantor.

Although the courts were clear that a conveyance of separate property
by a married woman was invalid and void for failure to comply with the
statutes absent one of the equitably adopted exceptions, a stranger to that
title could not take advantage of such failure. 1 23 In explaining this
position, the Texas Supreme Court said:
This court has consistently held the privy examination,
acknowledgment, and declaration before the officer, as required by the
statute, essential to the validity of a married woman's conveyance, and that a
defectively acknowledged deed to her separate lands did not convey her title
to the vendee, and was void. It repeated that "to hold otherwise would be
practically to repeal the statute." In order to give the statute effect and to
protect the married woman, such holdings were necessary and correct. But
we repeat that the only purpose of the statute was to protect the married
woman, and it was enacted for her benefit.
Though a deed of a married woman which is not acknowledged as
required by the statute be considered void as to her and her privies, we think
the proposition that a stranger to such title cannot be heard to raise the issue
reasonable and legally sound. Certainly it is
of its invalidity is 12thoroughly
4
equitable and just.

judgment in an action brought for that purpose within the time prescribed by law, and it must
follow that such facts can be shown only in two ways for the purpose of passing the tide of the
married woman: (1) [b]y the certificate; or (2) by judgment as stated.
Veeder v. Gilmer, 129 S.W. 595, 596 (Tex. 1910).
121. See Foster, 186 S.W.2d at 345-46 (noting a properly executed subsequent instrument could
correct the defective certificate of acknowledgment (citations omitted)); Chester v. Breitling, 32 S.W.
527, 529 (Tex. 1895) (stating a subsequent deed with a proper certificate of acknowledgment was the
equivalent of a re-execution of the first deed that had a defective certificate of acknowledgment).
122. See Foster, 186 S.W.2d at 347 (distinguishing how a proper correction of the certificate
related back to the original instrument's effective date as to the original parties, but as to the innocent
purchaser, the correction took effect on the date of the correction (citations omitted)); Hayden v.
Moffat, 12 S.W. 820, 821 (Tex. 1889) (indicating where the first deed from the grantor was not
entitled to registration due to an improper certificate of acknowledgment, a second grantee from the
same grantor took titie free of the first recorded deed).
123. See Buvens v. Brown, 18 S.W.2d 1057, 1062-63 (Tex. 1929) (reasoning the statute's only
purpose was the protection of married women, and thus deciding "a stranger to such title cannot be
heard to raise the issue of its invalidity").
124. Id.
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Therefore, the court acknowledged a void deed in a subsequent
purchaser's chain of title would not prevent such a subsequent purchaser
from being successful in a trespass to try title action in those cases where
the married woman or her heirs or privies were not parties to the suit. 2
Thus, notwithstanding the general rule concerning the invalidity of a
conveyance by a married woman because of the failure to comply with the
statutes concerning her acknowledgment, Texas courts applied equitable
principles to protect innocent purchasers1 2 6 when doing so was
authorized7 by statute or did not conflict with the ultimate purpose of the
12

statutes.

2. Deeds Considered Void as the Grantor Had No Intent to
Deliver the Deed
The Texas Property Code provides: "A conveyance of an estate of
inheritance, a freehold, or an estate for more than one year, in land and
tenements, must be in writing and must be subscribed and delivered by the
conveyor or by the conveyor's agent authorized in writing."' 128 Thus, to
constitute a valid conveyance, it is necessary that the grantor deliver the
deed to the grantee with the specific intent that such delivery will "become
operative as a conveyance." 12 9 However, absent proof to the contrary,
delivery is presumed when a deed is signed, acknowledged, recorded, and
30
in the possession of the grantee.1
125. See id. at 1060, 1063 (holding the defendant in the case could not raise the issue of invalidity
of the deed in the plaintiff's chain of tide). In Buvens v. Brown, the void deed was a necessary link in
the plaintiff's chain of title from the sovereign, but the court held the defendant could not defeat the
plaintiff's claim to title in the trespass to try title suit as the defendant was a stranger to that chain. Id.
The court indicated the sole purpose of the statute was to protect and benefit the married woman.
Id. at 1062.
126. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref.Co. v. Downey, 183 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1944) (limiting the
application of equitable rules that "estop married women from asserting the invalidity of their deeds[]
or other instruments required to be acknowledged" to circumstances involving "bona fide purchasers
for value and without notice").
127. See Buvens, 18 S.W.2d at 1062-63 (proclaiming a stranger to the title cannot attack its
invalidity when the married woman or her privies are not parties to the action as the statute setting
forth the requirements was meant solely for her protection).
128. TEX. PROP. CODE 5 5.021 (West 2016) (emphasis added).
129. See id.(requiring a conveyance to be in writing "and delivered by the conveyor"); see also
Steffian v. Milmo Nat'l Bank, 6 S.W. 823, 824 (Tex. 1888) (asserting the intention of the grantor to
effect a delivery makes the delivery of the deed operative).
130. See Stephens Cty. Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Tex. 1974)
(contending the filing of a deed for record presented "[a] prima facie case of delivery" with the
requisite intent to convey the land (first citing Thornton v. Rains, 299 S.W.2d 287, 289 ([ex. 1957);
and then citing Vannerberg v. Anderson, 206 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. 1947))); Morrison v. Parish,
384 S.W.2d 764, 765-66 ([ex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (noting the
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Stefian v. Milmo Naional Bank1 3 1 is the leading case explaining the legal
consequences subsequent purchasers face when there was no intent to
deliver a deed. 13 2 In that case, a deed was executed for the sale of land,
and the deed was to be held by the grantor until the purchase price was
paid. 13 3 However, the grantee obtained possession of the deed before
paying the purchase price by representing to the grantor that he needed
the deed to copy the field notes.' 3 4 Having obtained possession of the
deed, the grantee offered to give the bank a lien on the property that was
covered by the deed to obtain an extension of time to pay his debt to the
bank. 3 The bank agreed, and the grantee executed a deed to the bank
conveying the property in question. 13 6 The bank had no knowledge or
notice that the original grantor had not intended for the delivery of the
deed to the grantee to evidence the sale. 1 3 1 The issue for the court was
The court recognized
whether the bank was a bona fide mortgagee."'
that courts have held "a deed delivered without the consent of the grantor
is of no more effect to pass tide than if it were a forgery," and, therefore,
concluded the lower "court was in error in holding appellee a bona fide
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice." 1 3 9 However, by
way of dicta the Steffian court said:
It does not follow, however, that appellee may not make out a case entitling
it to judgment, although no effective delivery of the deed is shown. But in
order to do this he must bring himself within the rules applicable to an

presumption of intent to deliver arose, absent proof to the contrary, when a signed and
acknowledged instrument was recorded and in the possession of the grantee (citation omitted)); see
also West v. First Baptist Church of Taft, 71 S.W.2d 1090, 1099 (Tex. 1934) (determining the filing
for record of a deed of trust by the grantor "at the request or with the consent of the" mortgagee
amounted to a constructive delivery). The presumption of intent can be rebutted upon showing:
"(1) that the deed was delivered or recorded for a different purpose, (2) that fraud, accident[,] or
mistake accompanied the delivery or recording, or (3) that the grantor had no intention of divesting
himself of title." Stephens CQy.Museum, 517 S.W.2d at 262 (citations omitted).
131. Steffian v. Milmo Nat'l Bank, 6 S.W. 823 (Tex. 1888).
132. See generally id. at 824-25 (outlining the consequences of a deed delivered without the
necessary intent).
133. Id. at 823.
134. Id. at 824.
135. Id. at 823.
136. The bank and the grantee understood the deed was intended as a mortgage, despite the fact
that the "deed was an absolute conveyance on its face." Id.
137. Id. at 823-24.
138. Id. at 824.
139. Id. at 824-25 (citations omitted). The court also noted "even a vendee from the [initial]
grantee, who has paid value without knowledge of the facts, is not an innocent-purchaser." Id.
at 824.
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equitableestoppel, and must show that appellant's testator was grossly negligent
in permitting the deed to pass into the possession of [the grantee], and also
that, as a result of this, some substantial injury has accrued to the bank,
by
14 0
reason of the transaction, which it entered into upon faith of the deed.
In applying the equitable estoppel principle announced in the Steffian
case, 1 4 1 one court stated:
We do not think the court erred, as contended by appellant, in failing to
find for him on the issue of estoppel. J. D. Risinger put the deed in a drawer
in an organ, where he kept his private papers, in his residence. It is true that
Minnie Q. White was an inmate of his home; but she was his step-daughter,
and there is nothing in the testimony to indicate that he had any reason to
suppose that she would attempt, without permission, to obtain possession of
the deed. We do not think the court erred in failing to find that J. D.
Risinger was guilty of negligence in keeping the deed at the place and in the
manner referred
to, and the plea of estoppel is based upon the theory of
142
negligence.
Furthermore, in the event the grantor is fraudulently induced to have the
deed delivered to a grantee, a subsequent purchaser will be protected as an
innocent purchaser. 1 4 3 Thus, again, even in a case where the deed is
incapable of passing title, an innocent purchaser may be protected by
estoppel upon showing that either the delivery of the deed by the grantor
was a result of fraud committed on the grantor or that the grantor's
negligence resulted in the unauthorized delivery of the deed.1 4
140. Id. at 825 (emphasis added). In a later case, the supreme court indicated the Steffian court
held "one who signs and acknowledges a conveyance, to be delivered only upon conditions, may be
estopped to set up the non-delivery by negligenty permitting it to pass into the hands of the grantee."
Link v. Page, 10 S.W. 699, 701 (Tex. 1889) (emphasis added) (citing Steffian, 6 S.W. at 825). The Link
v. Page court explained this result by stating "where the owner of real property negligently clothes
another with the apparent title to it," the owner was estopped to deny the innocent purchaser title to
the property. Link, 10 S.W. at 701.
141. See Steffian, 6 S.W. at 825 (remanding a case to trial to determine whether the grantor was
grossly negligent in loaning the deed to the grantee when the grantor had no intention that such
transfer should be considered an operative delivery and conveyance).
142. Garner v. Risinger, 81 S.W. 343, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1904, writ ref'd).
143. See, e.g., Lynn v. McCoy, 200 S.W. 885, 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917, no writ)
(concluding where a deed was delivered out of escrow because of a fraud committed on the grantor,
the delivery was valid and the innocent sub-vendee was protected).
144. For example, in Lynn v. McCoy, the grantee committed a fraud against the grantor, and as a
result of the fraud, the grantor executed a deed and a contract, which authorized the escrow agent to
deliver the deed to the grantee upon the occurrence of certain specified conditions. Id. at 887-88.
Since the fraud was committed against the grantor by the grantee, rather than by "the bank in
delivering the deed" or by the grantee against the bank in procuring delivery of the deed, the court
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3. Trustee's Deeds Considered Void Following a Void
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale
Texas courts have distinguished between void and voidable nonjudicial
foreclosure sales. 1 4 5

Texas has adopted a general rule concerning void

foreclosure sales, which provides "[p]urchasers of land from a substitute
trustee's sale are not relieved from the necessity of inquiring whether the
trustee had been empowered to sell. One who bids on property at a
foreclosure sale does so 'at his peril.' 1 46 Furthermore, "[i]f the trustee
conducting the sale has no power or authority to offer the property for
sale, or if there is other defect or irregularity which would render the
foreclosure sale void, then the purchaser cannot acquire title to the
property." '4 7 Thus, Texas courts have stated "[t]he general effect of a
'good faith purchaser for value without notice' does not apply to a
purchaser at a void foreclosure sale. A purchaser at a foreclosure sale
obtains only such title as the trustee had authority to convey."48
held a subsequent purchaser from the grantee was protected and the grantor could not cancel the
deed. Id. at 889. The court distinguished the instance in which a grantor executes a deed without
delivering it or authorizing another to deliver it. Id. On the other hand, in Spots v. Whitaker, the
grantee obtained the deed by a fraud committed against the depository, which the grantor had not
authorized to deliver the deed until certain conditions were satisfied. Sports v. Whitaker, 157 S.W.
422, 422-23 (Tex.Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ refd). In that case, the court refused to afford the
innocent purchaser with protection unless the purchaser could establish that an act of negligence by
the grantor resulted in the delivery. See id. at 424 ("[A] deed obtained from [the] depository without
the consent of the grantor, through the fraud of the grantee, is wholly insufficient to pass title, and
parties claiming thereunder as innocent purchasers or incumbrancers will be protected only upon an
estoppel based upon a showing that the grantor was guilty of negligence which brought about the
unauthorized delivery." (citations omitted)).
145. The difference between a void and voidable deeds has been explained as follows:
Whether the trustee's deed is void or voidable depends on its effect upon the tide at the time it
was executed and delivered. If it was a mere nullity, passing no title and conferring no rights
whatsoever, it was absolutely void, but if it passed title to ... the purchaser, thereby
accomplishing the thing sought to be accomplished, subject only to the right of Walker to have it set
aside uponproofthat the sale was improperly made, then itwas merely voidable. Even if a conveyance
is regular on its face, it does not always or necessarily operate to pass title between the parties at
the dime of its
execution, particularly in cases of fraud. A deed may be presumptively valid, and
yet be utterly void as a conveyance when the presumption is rebutted.
Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (citation omitted).
146. Id.at 723 (quoting Henke v. First S. Props., Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
147. Henke, 586 S.W.2d at 620.
148. Diversified, Inc., 702 S.W.2d at 721 (citing First S. Props., Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339,
341 (Tex. 1976)); see also Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919,
writ refd) (stating purchasers at a void foreclosure sale were not bona fide purchasers for value
(citation omittedi)). See generally Daniels v. Mason, 38 S.W. 161, 162 (Tex. 1896) (holding the
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Texas courts have held nonjudicial foreclosure sales and their related
trustees' deeds void in a number of situations, including: foreclosure sales
conducted by persons other than the duly qualified trustee or substitute
trustee,1 4 9 foreclosure sales conducted when there had been no default by
the mortgagor under the terms of the deed of trust, 5 0° foreclosure sales
conducted without a court order where the property was in
receivership,1 5 1 foreclosure sales when the trustee has not been
during dependent
conducted
sales
foreclosure
authorized,1 5 2
and failure to
authorization,153
administration of an estate without court
1 54
In the case of a void
give the statutory notice of the trustee's sale.
foreclosure, since the purchaser acquires no tide or rights in the property,
an action in law for trespass to try title may be brought, and "the statutes
5 On the
of limitation governing actions for the recovery of land apply." 15'
other hand, in the case of a voidable foreclosure sale, tide passes to the

purchaser of the legal title from one who was without the power to convey it could not be a bona
fide purchaser for value).
Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (T1ex. 1942) (concluding a nonjudicial
149. See, e.g.,
foreclosure sale conducted by one who possessed no authority was void as to the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale).
150. See, e.g., Henke, 586 S.W.2d at 620 (rejecting the applicability of the doctrine of good faith
purchaser "to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale").
151. See, e.g., Vallone, 533 S.W.2d at 342 (stating it was not necessary for the receiver to file
notice of lis pendens to authorize setting aside an unauthorized sale).
152. See, e.g., Bowman, 212 S.W. at 551 (regarding a foreclosure sale as void because the trustee
was only authorized to conduct the sale at the request of the beneficiary or holder of the notes and
such request was never made). The authority of a trustee to conduct a sale depends upon the terms
("[A] power of sale given in a deed or mortgage must be strictly followed
of the deed of trust. See id.
in all its details." (quoting Bemis v. Williams, 74 S.W. 332, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1903,
no writ))). In Bowman v. Oaklf, the trustee was authorized to sell "only 'at the request of [the]
beneficiary or other holder of [the] notes."' Id. at 550. Therefore, the sale was void as the holder of
the notes had not requested the trustee to conduct the foreclosure sale. Id. at 551.
153. See, e.g., Pearce v. Stokes, 291 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. 1956) (determining the opening of
a dependent administration suspended the power of sale and, thus, a sale conducted without court
authority was void). However, a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under a deed of trust is effective to pass
title when made during the pendency of an independent administration. See, e.g., Taylor v. Williams,
108 S.W. 815, 817-18 (rex. 1908) (deciding a creditor, during the pendency of an independent
administration, "is left to pursue the general rules of law by which remedies are given," including
exercising the creditor's power of sale).
154. See Hous. First Am. Sav. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 769 (Tex. 1983) (concluding a
substitute trustee's deed was void due to the failure to give the required notice of the trustee's sale);
Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied)
(ruling the foreclosure sale void because notice of the trustee sale was not sent by certified mail as
required by the statute and the deed of trust).
155. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Qualls, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. 1942) (explaining "the statutes of
limitation governing actions for recovery of land apply," as opposed to the four-year statute of
limitations, since a void deed does not need to be set aside).
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purchaser subject to the right of the mortgagor or those claiming under
him to have the sale set aside upon proof of the improper sale within four
years.15 6 Texas courts also allow the purchaser at a void or irregular
foreclosure who has taken possession in reliance of such foreclosure to
remain in possession until the debt is paid by the original mortgagor."' 7
Notwithstanding the rather unequivocal position that one cannot
be an innocent purchaser if a void deed exists in one's chain of title,"' 8
Texas courts have made an exception to this rule of law in certain cases
where one's chain of title contained a void trustee's deed as a result of a
void foreclosure sale.1 5 9 Randooh v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock16 °
was one of the first cases to thoroughly discuss this issue. 6 1 In that case,
the jury found the properly appointed successor trustee had not conducted
the foreclosure sale.1 6 2 As a result, the sale, which was conducted "by one
who possessed no authority to make it, was void in so far as [the
mortgagors], the purchaser at such sale, and any subsequent purchasers
with notice [were] concerned." 1' 6 3 The sale was made under a deed of
trust, which the mortgagors executed, that contained the following
provision:
156. See S. Tr. & Mortg. Co. v. Daniel, 184 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1944) (explaining when a deed
of trust did not authorize a trustee/nonbeneficiary to purchase at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the
sale was voidable at the election of the mortgagor); see also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.051
(West 2016) (declaring every action that does not have a limitation period specified, other than an
action to recover land, must be brought within four years of accruing).
157. See, e.g.,Jasper State Bank v. Braswell, 111 S.W.2d 1079, 1081, 1084 (Tex. 1938) (clarifying
this rule applies even if "the debt is barred by limitation'). The Jasper State Bank v. Braswell court
indicated that in the event of a void or irregular foreclosure sale, third persons or mortgagees who
purchased at the void sale would become subrogated "to the rights of the mortgagee to the extent of
the purchase money paid at the foreclosure sale" and the mortgage would be treated as still in effect.
Id. at 1084 (citations omitted).
158. See, e.g., Henke v. First S. Props., Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming the trial court's decision "because the doctrine of good faith purchaser for
value without notice does not apply to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale").
159. See Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 141 S.W.2d 1030, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) (denoting an exception to the general rule that permits the
innocent purchaser doctrine to apply to a buyer who pays valuable consideration to purchase land
from a seller holding the apparent title and who has no notice of infirmities therein (citing Mast v.
Tibbles, 60 Tex. 301, 305 (1883))).
160. Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 141 S.W.2d 1030 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.).
161. See generally id. at 1034-35 (elucidating the scenarios when one is not eligible to be an
innocent purchaser and the exceptions that may entitle one to such protection).
162. Id. at 1032. The evidence was undisputed that an agent of the substitute trustee conducted
the foreclosure sale, received the bids, accepted a bid, "and announced that the property was sold to
Bob Slaughter." Id.
163. Id.
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"And it is further specially agreed by the parties hereunto that in any deed or
deeds given by any [t]rustee or substitute duly appointed hereunder, any and
all statements of facts or other recitals therein made as to the nonopayment
of the money secured, or as to the request to sell, the time, place, terms of sale,
and property to be sold having been duly published, or as to any other act or
thing having been duly done by any [t]rustee, or substitute, shall be taken by
any and all courts of law and equity as prima facie evidence that said
statements 16or4 recitals do state facts, and are without further question to be
accepted."
The trustee's deed was signed on the same day of the foreclosure by the
actual substitute trustee and contained the following language:
"Whereas, I did, in accordance with said notices, on the first Tuesday in
December, 1933, being the 5th day of the month, between the hours of
10:00 A. M. and 4:00 o'clock P. M. on said date, offer said property for sale
at public auction to the highest bidder for cash at the courthouse door in
Hockley County, in the town of Levelland, at which sale the property was
struck off to Bob Slaughter for the sum of $1[,]500.42. '' 165
The land purchased at the foreclosure sale was conveyed by Bob Slaughter
to Citizens National Bank who, three years after acquiring the land,
entered into an oil and gas lease and, four years subsequent to the
foreclosure sale, sold the land by general warranty deed. 16 6 The jury
found that all of these subsequent transferees paid valuable consideration

164. Id. at 1032-33 (emphasis added). In reaching its decision, the court distinguished the case
of Bowman, 212 S.W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ refd). Randooh, 141 S.W.2d
at 1033-34. In Bowman, the evidence was clear that the holder of the notes had not requested the
trustee to sell the property, but the subsequent purchaser asserted he relied upon recitals in the
trustee's deed that indicated the holder of the notes did request the sale. Bowman, 212 S.W. at 551.
However, the deeds of trust at issue did not authorize the trustee to make the statement in the
trustee's deed that he had been requested to conduct the sale. Id. While the recitals were merely
prima facie evidence, the court was authorized to determine what truly happened. Id. at 552. The
court concluded that since the trustee had not been requested to conduct the foreclosure sale and did
not have the power to conduct the foreclosure sale, the sale was, thus, void irrespective of the recitals
in the trustee's deed. Id. However, the court stated, by way of obiter dicta, that had the deeds of
trust authorized the trustee to state in the trustee's deed that he was requested to conduct the sale
and the trustee had done so, the grantors of the deed of trust would have been bound by the
representation in the deed under principles of estoppel, even if the request had not been made. Id.
The Randoh court noted that in the case before it, the recitals made by the trustee, in the trustee's
deed, were all authorized by the language in the deed of trust, unlike in the Bowman case. Rando oh,
141 S.W.2d at 1034.
165. Randooh, 141 S.W.2d at 1033.
166. Id.
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without any knowledge of the void foreclosure sale. 1 6 7 The question for
the appellate court was whether the void foreclosure sale would deprive
the subsequent transferees of innocent purchaser status. 1 6 8
The court held the subsequent transferees were protected by the

equitable doctrine of innocentpurchasers.'69 This determination was first based
upon the fact that the grantors, in the deed of trust, authorized the trustee
to make all the necessary recitals in the trustee's deed detailing his actions
concerning the sale. " ° In addition, the court found there was nothing in
the record to put the subsequent transferees who had paid valuable
consideration on inquiry as to the falsity of the recitals in the deed."'
The court concluded by saying:
This conclusion is impelled, not because of the actual power in the trustee to
convey the land, as he attempted to do by the trustee's deed, but by the
beneficent provisions of the doctrine of equity which shields one who
purchases land under such conditions and imposes the loss upon him who
has been generous in the extension to others of authority to bind him in
72
such situations.1

The court then noted that because the subsequent transferees acquired
167. Id.
168. See generaly id. at 1033-34 (listing the three main issues controlling the court's disposition,
and summarizing the appellants' arguments).
169. Id. at 1034.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court cited three cases to support this proposition. Id. Two of the cases dealt with
an innocent purchaser extinguishing the rights of individuals with an unrecorded equitable title or
interest to property and, thus, did not fully support the proposition for which they were cited. See
Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 195 S.W. 1139, 1143 ('ex. 1917) (blocking the equitable claims of a
deceased wife's heirs by applying the equitable doctrine of innocent purchaser to protect a party who
purchased from the deceased wife's husband, a legal title holder, without notice that the property was
community property); Blair v. Hennessy, 138 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1911)
(asserting an innocent purchaser for value takes free of the claims of unrecorded equitable interests),
affd, 173 S.W. 871 (Tex. 1915). However, the third case was right on point. In Schneider v. Sellers, the
court, noting that land had been released from the deed of trust prior to the foreclosure sale, stated:
The release of the land from the lien of the deed of trust terminated the power of the trustee to
sell the same, and the subsequent sale which was made by the trustee for the benefit of [the lien
holder] was void and conferred no title upon [the purchaser at the foreclosure sale]; but the
deed of trust and the sale conferred upon [the purchaser at the foreclosure sale] the apparent
title to the land, whereby they were enabled to convey to the [subsequent purchaser-a bona
fide purchaser for value-the legal title to the land, which constituted a good defense against
the action of the plaintiffs below for the recovery of the land.
Schneider v. Sellers, 84 S.W. 417, 421 (Tex. 1905).
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their interest in the property from the apparent legal title owner for value
and without knowledge of any infirmities, they were "protected under the
equitable doctrine of innocent purchaser." 1 73 The court also stated, by
way of obiter dicta, that the mortgagors were estopped from asserting that
no title passed to those who acquired their interest from the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale because of the broad authority given to "the trustee to
make binding representations" in the trustee's deed. 174 As a result of such
authorization, the court indicated the mortgagors could not "now be heard
to say that the statements of the trustee in his deed are untrue and thereby
deprive innocent purchasers of the title which, through the assurance of
they were acquiring by the
appellants, they had the right to believe
1 75
payment of valuable considerations.'
In 1942, the holding in Randolph was reaffirmed by the Texas Supreme
Court in Slaughter.176 In the Slaughter case, the foreclosure was void for
two reasons: (1) the note secured by the deed of trust was not in default;
and (2) like the Randolph case, the substitute trustee failed to personally
conduct the foreclosure sale.1 7 7 The purchaser at the foreclosure sale later
sold the property twice; however, in each instance the grantee
subsequently conveyed the property back to the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale. 1 7 Then, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale executed
an oil and gas lease and conveyed certain mineral interests.' 7 9 The court
of civil appeals held these subsequent transferees from the purchaser at the
void foreclosure sale were innocent purchasers. 1 80 The primary issue
173. Randoph, 141 S.W.2d at 1034 (citing Mast v. Tibbles, 60 Tex. 301, 305 (1883)).
174. Id. at 1035.
175. Id.
176. See Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. 1942) (concluding the mortgagor, "by
the execution of the deed of trust, made it possible for the trustee to create the appearance of good
tide in [the purchaser at the foreclosure sale], and it would be inequitable to permit [the mortgagor]
now to show otherwise as against those who have purchased in good faith in reliance thereon"
(citations omitted)); see also Randoph, 141 S.W.2d at 1035 ("In addition to ... the status of appellees as
innocent purchasers it may be said that appellants are estopped from contending that no title passed
to appellees on account of the unauthorized manner in which the trustee's sale was conducted
because of the liberal authority conferred by them upon the trustee to make binding representations
as to the manner in which he sold the land.").
177. Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 674; see also Randoh, 141 S.W.2d at 1032 (reciting the facts of the
case, one of which was "that the sale was not made by any person who had authority to make it").
178. See Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 673-74 (listing the conveyances of the property from 1933 to
1937). The first subsequent purchaser imposed a lien on the land, which remained on the land at the
time of suit. Slaughter v. Quails, 149 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941), affd,
162 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1942).
179. Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 673-74. These interests were subsequently assigned, and a deed of
trust was executed on these interests to secure indebtedness. Quails, 149 S.W.2d at 654.
180. See.Qualls, 149 S.W.2d at 656 (concluding the lower court erred in failing to provide the jury
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before the supreme court was whether the trustee's deed was void so that
no title passed from the grantor of the deed of trust.1 8 1 The court noted
there was "nothing on the face of the trustee's deed that would render it
void" and the recitals in the deed contained all that was "necessary to
show a valid sale."' 8 2 However, the court determined the "conditions and
limitations on the trustee's power to convey the land were never fulfilled"
and, therefore, held "the foreclosure sale and trustee's deed were
absolutely void."' 8 3 As such, it was not necessary for the mortgagor to set
84
aside the trustee's deed because it conveyed no title to the purchaser.'
Consequently, the mortgagor's suit for trespass to try title was not barred
by limitations,"' and he could redeem the land by paying the unpaid
with a peremptory instruction in favor of the subsequent purchasers). In doing so the court of civil
appeals stated:
There being nothing in the record to show that [the subsequent grantees] had knowledge of
any infirm[i] ties or irregularities in the substitute trustee's sale, and the resignation of the original
trustee, the appointment of the substitute trustee[,] and the substitute trustee's deed being
regular in form and complying in every detail with the provisions of the deed of trust, and
showing on their faces that each and every condition, even to the minutest detail, which had
been laid down by appellee in the deed of trust had been observed, they were warranted in
assuming that Sue Alice Slaughter had procured at the trustee's sale the full title owned by
appellee in the land and in our opinion the court erred in refusing to give to the jury the
peremptory instruction in their favor.
Id. Quails, the mortgagor, did not appeal from that part of the court of civil appeals' decision that
denied him recovery from those creditors and subsequent purchasers who had acquired their interest
in good faith. See Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 674 (reasoning the lack of appeal leaves the court
unconcerned with those purchasers' rights).
181. See Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 673 (delineating the issues of the case). The defendants pleaded
that the cause of action was barred by the residual four-year statute of limitations because the
foreclosure sale had occurred over four years prior to the filing of the suit. Id.; see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.051 (West 2016) (setting forth the modern day four-year statute of
limitations). If the deed was voidable, an equitable suit to cancel the deed would have had to have
been brought before a suit to recover the land. Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 674 (citations omitted). Such
a suit would have been barred by the four-year statute of limitations. See id. (explaining the necessity
of determining whether the trustee's deed was voidable or void since if it was merely voidable, the
four-year statute of limitations would control (citations omitted)). However, if the deed were void,
then the statute of limitations for the recovery of land would apply; therefore, the mortgagor's
trespass to try title suit would not have been barred by limitations. See id. (deciding the court must
determine "whether the trustee's deed was void or merely voidable to determine whether or not the
suit was barred by limitation").
182. Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 674.
183. Namely, the issues with the sale's validity were the absence of a default authorizing the sale
and the substitute trustee's failure to conduct the sale. Id. at 675.
184. See id. at 674-75 (recognizing the availability of a collateral attack on the judgment by way
of trespass to try title since the trustee's sale and deed were void).
185. The mortgagor's action was controlled by the statutes of limitation for recovery of land,
not the four-year residuary statute. Id. at 675.
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purchase price. 1 8 6 Although the mortgagor did not appeal the judgment
against him in favor of the subsequent purchasers, 18 7 the supreme court,
by way of obiter dicta, stated:
It is true that under circumstances such as we have here, those who
purchased interests in or took liens on the land in good faith from Mrs.
Slaughter[, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale,] after the purported sale to
her by the substitute trustee acquired good title as against Qualls[, the
mortgagor]; but this is so not on the theory that the title actually passed, but
rather on the theory that Quails, by the execution of the deed of trust, made
it possible for the trustee to create the appearance of good title in Mrs.
Slaughter, and it would be inequitable to permit Quails now to show otherwise
188
as against those who have purchased in good faith in reliance thereon.

Both the Randolph and the Slaughter courts of appeals' decisions held the
question of notice was a fact question and was not determined as a matter
of law from the mere presence of a void instrument in the subsequent
purchaser's chain of title. 18 9 Neither this legal reasoning nor the reference
to equitable considerations in the Slaughter court's obiter dicta had been
questioned until the A.P.L case.190

186. Id.
at 677.
187. Id. at 674. The court of civil appeals held the parties who had taken interests from the
purchaser at the void foreclosure sale were protected as innocent purchasers because there was no
evidence they had actual knowledge of the irregularities in the sale and the trustee's deed contained
recitals, authorized by the deed of trust, indicating every condition precedent for the sale had been
properly performed. Slaughter v. Quails, 149 S.W.2d 651, 655-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941),
aftd 162 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1942).
188. Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
189. Cf..Qualls, 149 S.W.2d at 656 (deciding the applicability of the innocent purchaser doctrine
to the subsequent purchasers was unaffected by the void deed due to the deed's compliance with all
provisions set forth in the deed of trust that gave the initial purchaser apparent tide and the lack of
evidence that the purchasers had notice); Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 141 S.W.2d
1030, 1034 (iex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cot.) (applying the doctrine of
innocent purchaser to protect the appellee who paid valuable consideration for the land since the
to put them on inquiry notice "as to the falsity of
record did not contain anything in the chain of title
the representations made by the trustee').
Gholson v. Peeks, 224 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastand 1949, writ ref'd)
190. See, e.g.,
(relying on Slaughterto hold that where the mortgagor's execution of a deed of trust permitted the
in the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, it would be
trustee to create the appearance of good title
inequitable to permit the mortgagor to show otherwise as to subsequent purchasers for value).
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IV. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INNOCENT PURCHASER OF LAND

A. Actual and Constructive Notice
To receive the special protection of taking free of unrecorded
instruments, a subsequent purchaser must acquire property in good faith
for value and without notice of any third party's' interest or claim. 9 1 Such
notice192 can "be either actual or constructive." 193 Constructive notice is
imputed to one who does not have personal information or knowledge;
instead, such notice is implied by law and arises from properly recorded
instruments or the possession of land. 194 In fact, "recorded instruments
in a grantee's chain of title generally" "establish an irrebuttable
Actual notice literally means personal
presumption of notice."'1 9 5
196
information or knowledge and is considered to be a question of fact.
However, actual notice is broader than just express actual notice as it also
includes implied actual notice. 1 97 Almost one hundred years ago, the
191. See TEX. PROP. CODE 5 13.001(a) (West 2016) ("A conveyance of real property or an
interest in real property or a mortgage or a deed of trust is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice unless the instrument has been acknowledged,
sworn to, or proved and filed for record as required by law.").
192. An unrecorded deed is binding on subsequent purchasers who have notice of it. Id.
5 13.001(b). In describing notice, the Texas Supreme Court said:
"Notice may be broadly defined as information concerning a fact actually communicated to a
person by an authorized person, or actually derived by him from a proper source, or else
presumed by law to have been acquired. The latter (presumed) information is regarded as
equivalent in legal effects to a full knowledge, and to it the law attributes the same consequences
as would be imputed to knowledge. Notice as thus defined is not always synonymous with
'knowledge' or 'information' as commonly understood, for in law a person may be held to have
notice of something about which he has no actual knowledge or information."
Flack v. First Nat'l Bank of Dalhart, 226 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex. 1950) (citation omitted).
193. Flack, 226 S.W.2d at 631 (citation omitted).
194. See Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (enumerating the
types of possession that will charge a purchaser with constructive notice); HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel,
982 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Tex. 1998) (discussing the doctrine of constructive notice's consequence of "an
irrebuttable presumption of actual notice" of certain matters (citing Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d
83, 85 (Tex. 1981))); White v. McGregor, 50 S.W. 564, 565 (Tex. 1899) (recognizing recorded
documents constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers).
195. While not all recorded documents give rise to "an irrebuttable presumption of notice,"
those in one's chain of title usually do. Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex.
2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). An early supreme court stated "constructive notice is no more
than evidence of notice, the presumption of which is so violent that the court will not even allow of
its being controverted." Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326, 333 (1846) (citation omitted).
196. Flack, 226 S.W.2d at 631-32 (citation omitted). Actual notice has been described as that
which is "directly communicated to the person to be affected." Id. at 631 (citation omitted).
197. See id at 631-32 (claiming actual notice also includes knowledge that could be ascertained
by reasonable inquiry (citation omitted)).
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Texas Commission of Appeals distinguished the various notices:
In common parlance, "actual notice" generally consists in express
information of a fact, but in law the term is more comprehensive. In law[,]
whatever fairly puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice, where the means
of knowledge are at hand, which if pursued by the proper inquiry the full
truth might have been ascertained. Means of knowledge with the duty of
using them are in equity equivalent to knowledge itself. Where there is a
duty of finding out and knowing, negligent ignorance has the same effect in
law as actual knowledge. So that, in legal parlance, actual knowledge
embraces those things of which the one sought to be charged has express
information, and likewise those things which a reasonably diligent inquiry
and exercise of the means of information at hand would have disclosed.
Actual notice is always a question of fact.
Constructive notice is as effectual and binding as actual notice, but it is
the very opposite of actual notice and would not exist but for statute. It is
the legal effect prescribed by law of certain things most frequently illustrated
by registration statutes, lis pendens notices, and the like. Unlike actual
19 8
notice, the inference is not rebuttable.
Thus, it had been clear that, in Texas, "[a] purchaser is charged with and
bound by every recital, reference[,] and reservation contained in or fairly
disclosed by any instrument which forms an essential link in the chain of
'1 9 9
title under which he claims."
198. Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgm't affirmed) (citations
omitted). An earlier supreme court explained the duty of inquiry in the following words:
"The general doctrine is, that whatever puts a party upon an inquiry amounts, in judgment of
law, to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in the case of purchasers and creditors,
and would lead to the knowledge of the requisite fact, by the exercise of ordinary diligence and
understanding."
Wethered's Adm'r v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143, 150 (1856) (citation omitted); seealso Champlin Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Chastain, 403 S.W.2d 376, 388 (Tex. 1965) (asserting the legal consequences of implied actual
notice and express actual notice are the same).
199. Wessels v. Rio Bravo Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 668, 670 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ
ref'd) (citations omitted). The rationale for this rule was described as follows:
It is a familiar and thoroughly well-settled principle of realty law that a purchaser has
constructive notice of every matter connected with or affecting his estate which appears by
recital, reference, or otherwise upon the face of any deed which forms an essential link in the
chain of instruments through which [the purchaser] deraigns his title. The rationale of the rule
is that any description, recital of fact, or reference to other documents puts the purchaser upon
inquiry, and [the purchaser] is bound to follow up this inquiry, step by step, from one discovery
to another and from one instrument to another, until the whole series of title deeds is exhausted
and a complete knowledge of all the matters referred to and affecting the estate is obtained.
Being thus put upon inquiry, the purchaser is presumed to have prosecuted it until its final
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However, the Texas Supreme Court later made a significant shift in the
scope of inquiry that was required as a result of facts or knowledge
acquired through actual notice.2 ° ° Prior to 1982, it was understood the
duty of inquiry under implied actual notice was limited to those documents
and facts in one's chain of title that would appear to be title related to an
Yet, in 1982, the supreme
ordinary prudent purchaser or creditor. 20
court expanded the scope of inquiry required of a subsequent purchaser by
adopting a kind of 'incorporation by reference' doctrine" 20 2 under which
"a purchaser must search all instruments referenced by any other
instruments he is required to search, whether or not reasonably related to
title."12 0 3 In Guff Oil Corp. v. Westland Oil Development Cop.,2 °4 the court of
appeals, in reversing a summary judgment for an equitable title owner, held
a question of fact existed as to whether a reasonable purchaser was placed
on a duty to review an operating agreement due to a reference to that

result and with ultimate success.
Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305, 307-08 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ ref'd).
200. See Angus Earl McSwain, Note, Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil: New
UncertaintiesAs to the Scope of Title Search, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 629 (1983) (opining the Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Westland Oil Development Corp. case signaled a change in the rule governing when to impose the
scope of implied actual notice on purchasers).
at 650 (indicating before the Westland Oil case, the doctrine of implied actual notice
201. See id.
did not impute "notice of all facts," but rather implied notice of only those facts that "reasonably
refer to and serve to excite his interest in title matters"). Due to this prior understanding, the court
of civil appeals held a question of fact existed as to whether a reasonable purchaser was under inquiry
notice to review an operating agreement because its normal function was not title related. Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 620 S.W.2d 765, 770 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981), rev'd,
637 S.W.2d 903 (rex. 1982); see also Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903,
913-14 (rex. 1982) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (distinguishing all the cases cited in the majority opinion
since they dealt with different facts wherein an instrument that reflected an equitable interest and
suggested outstanding title rights were referenced in documents in the purchaser's chain of title), revg
620 S.W.2d 765 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981). Furthermore, in White, the court limited the scope
of inquiry as follows:
The effect of the statute of registration is to create a legal, irrebuttable presumption on part of
subsequent purchasers that they know of the existence of the duly-recorded deed. Now, to
presume notice of the deed, and then from the face of itto presume that the land was sold by
the sheriff because the prior deed of the defendant on execution was fraudulent, is to build one
presumption upon another, which is never allowed.
White v. McGregor, 50 S.W. 564, 566 (rex. 1899).
202. See McSwain, supra note 200 (positing this new doctrine "foreshadows significant changes
in the imposition of notice").
203. Id.
204. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Westland Oil Dev. Corp., 620 S.W.2d 765 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1981), rev'd, 637 S.W.2d 903 (rex. 1982).
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document in their assignment of a property interest.2" 5 The operating
agreement referenced a letter agreement, which contained an area of
20 6
mutual interest clause, creating an equitable title in an adverse party.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and entered judgment for
the equitable title holder, holding:
I]he reference to the March 1, 1968, operating agreement contained in the
May 22, 1973, assignment from Mobil to Gulf and Superior, as a matter of law,
charged Gulf and Superior[, the subsequent purchasers,] with the duty of
inspecting said agreement. As a result, Gulf and Superior were charged with
notice of the November 15, 1966, letter agreement and the equitable claim
20 7
of Westland, and cannot enjoy the status of innocent purchasers.

This expanded scope of inquiry, under implied actual notice, to documents
that a reasonably prudent purchaser would not think to be title related was
sharply criticized. 20 8

205. Id. at 770. The court of civil appeals stated:
As an example of the difficulty facing the [p]laintiffs, the normal function of an operating
agreement is to explain in detail the operation between the various interests in the development
of a tract of land for the economical production of the minerals. Reference as to the superiority
of the letter agreement over its terms could well have alerted a diligent purchaser of the title that
such a letter only controlled operations and in no way affected tide.
Id.
206. Westland Oil,637 S.W.2d at 905-06.
207. Id. at 908. Although the operating agreement was not filed of record, the defendants had
copies of it in their files. Id. The dissent argued that, under principles of implied actual notice, a
purchaser is not required, as a matter of law, to inquire for tide defects in documents outside of her
chain of title that reference other documents that "do not necessarily suggest a tide matter." See id.
at 912 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (noting implied actual notice is generally a question of fact, and
recognizing "the duty of inquiry extends only to matters which are fairly suggested by the facts really
known" (citations omitted)). The dissent acknowledged the purchasers were on notice of the
operating agreement because their tide derived from an assignment that referenced the operating
agreement. Id. at 913. But, the dissent asserted the operating agreement was not in the defendants'
chain of title, and furthermore, the operating agreement contained no reference to any equitable
rights or title in the plaintiff. Id.
208. One commentator, in criticizing the court's opinion, stated:
The prudent purchaser's standard of inquiry and the principles of implied actual notice
should not be so easily abandoned. The "two step" analysis has been developed through the
years, and is considered a reasonable burden on the purchaser. Under this burden the purchaser
is only required to reasonably ascertain the strength of his tide and to take sufficient steps to
protect it.

McSwan, supra note 200, at 654. This commentator contended that the supreme court disregarded
"the second step of the 'chain of title' analysis, and adopt[ed] a type of 'incorporation by reference'
doctrine." Id.
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B. Texas Department of Transportation v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC
The A.P.I. case began as a simple case involving an inversecondemnation claim against the City and TxDOT for the taking of soil on
land API claimed to own.2 0 9 API asserted it was a bona fide purchaser
for value of the property in question, a 9.869-acre tract of land, having
bought it as part of a 34-acre purchase from Herschell White in September
of 2004.2 ° Both defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction claiming
immunity from the suit because the plaintiff did not own the property and,
thus, had no standing to bring the suit. 2 1 ' As relevant to the case, there
were two documents in API's chain of tide for the property in
question. 2 1 2 First, there was a judgment from 2003 (the 2003 Judgment)
that adopted a special commissioners' award vesting the City with feesimple tide to the 9.869 acres of land.2 13 On April28, 2004, this
judgment was recorded in Hidalgo County's official records. 2 14 The
209. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166 (rex. 2013)
(acknowledging API brought suit when TxDOT started digging), revg City of Edinburg v. A.P.I. Pipe
& Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010).
210. See id. at 166 & n.3 (rex. 2013) (reporting API purchased the 34 acres, which included the
9.869 acres in dispute, for $292,800).
211. City of Edinburg v. A.P.I Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82, 87 (rex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2010), revd sub nom. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162
TEX. CONST.art. I, 5 17(d) (waiving immunity for state and political subdivisions
(rex. 2013); see aLrso
in inverse-condemnation suits). One of the obvious conditions for a plaintiff to recover on an
inverse-condemnation suit is ownership of the property being taken. See Gen. Servs. Comm'n v.
Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (rex. 2001) (explaining the takings clause of the
Constitution prohibits taking a person's property without just compensation (citing TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 17(d))).
212. See A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 165 (listing two judgments as the "conflicting records" in API's
chain of tile).
213. City of Edinburg, 328 S.W.3d at 86-87. The City's petition for condemnation "sought to
acquire fee title to 9.869 acres of land.., for the public purpose of laying out, opening, constructing,
reconstructing, maintaining, and operating a certain right-of-way for U.S. Highway 281 drainage
outfall ditches." Id.at 86. The prayer to the petition requested to have three commissioners
appointed and for the City to "have a final judgment of condemnation vesting in the fee title to said
land." Id.The commissioners awarded compensation to the owner of the land and "also awarded
the City 'all rights described and prayed for in"' its petition. Id. Thereafter, the court "entered its
2003 Judgment, which "adopt[ed] the special connissioners' award that vested fee tide in the City."
Id.at 86-87.
214. Id. at 88. After the trial court denied the defendants' pleas to the jurisdiction, the appellate
court affirmed since the record in the case was unclear as to whether API had notice of the 2003
Judgment. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, No. 13-07-221-CV, 2008 WL 99629,
at *5 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 10, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). The court explained its
affirmation of the denial of the pleas to the jurisdiction in the following language:
[Tio recover on its inverse condemnation claim, API must have owned the property at issue.
Although we have concluded that the City acquired the property at issue in fee simple pursuant
to the 2003 Judgment, an unrecorded conveyance of any interest in real property is void as to a
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second relevant document in API's chain was a judgment nunc pro tunc
(the 2004 Judgment), which arose in the same case as the 2003 Judgment
and pertained to the same 9.869 acres of property.2 1 s However, unlike
the earlier judgment, the 2004 Judgment stated the City acquired "a right of
way easement over" the property in question for purposes of "opening,
constructing[,] and maintaining a permanent channel or drainage
easement. ' 2 16 The 2004 Judgment stated it "super[s]edes and makes [the]
'Judgment of Court in Absence of Objection' signed on June 3, 2003[,]
null and void, without effect and vacated by this [c]ourt. This [c]ourt
hereby enters the [j]udgment [n]unc [p]ro [t]unc as the sole and final
judgment of the case. ' ' 2 11 Itwas undisputed that the "2004 Judgment was
filed in the real property records" of Hidalgo County on May 19, 2004,218
and that "(1) counsel for the 'Whites; (2) counsel for the City of Edinburg;
and (3) TxD[OT] representatives" agreed and consented to the 2004
Judgment.2 19 Subsequently, "the City granted an easement over the
property in question to the State of Texas, by and through TxDOT, 'for
the purpose of opening, constructing[,] and maintaining a permanent
channel or drainage easement. '220
The trial court denied the defendants' pleas to the jurisdiction, and an
interlocutory appeal was taken. 22 1 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision that the 2004 Judgment was void because it was an
attempt to correct a judicial error after the court's plenary power had
creditor or subsequent purchaser who gives valuable consideration and is without actual notice
of the transaction. There is evidence in the record that only the void 2004 Judgment was
recorded and that API purchased the property from White subject to an easement owned by the
City. There is no support in the record to establish that the conveyance to the City in fee
simple, awarded pursuant to the 2003 Judgment, was recorded. Furthermore, API asserts it did
not have actual knowledge of the 2003 Judgment. Thus, fact questions remain which affect the
jurisdictional issue of appellants' immunity claim. Because a trial court cannot grant the plea to
the jurisdiction if the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the trial
court correctly denied appellants' pleas to the jurisdiction.
Id.(citations omitted).
215. City ofEdinbur&328 S.W.3d at 87.
216. Id.
217. Id. (second and third alterations in original).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 88 (noting this was "an agreed judgment"); see also Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. AP.L
Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Tex. 2013) (stating "no evidence suggests deliberate
inducement (as opposed to mistaken acquiescence) by TxDOT or the City" in acquiescing to the
2004 Judgment), revg City of Edinburg v. API. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82 (rex. App.Corpus Christi 2010).
220. Ciqof Ecinburg,328 S.W.3d at 87.
221. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. API. Pipe & Supply, LLC, No. 13-07-221-CV, 2008 WIL 99629,
at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 10, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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expired. 2 2 2 However, the court of appeals concluded there was a fact
issue pertaining to API's status as an innocent purchaser and, therefore,
affirmed the trial court's denial of the pleas to the jurisdiction. 2 23 The
defendants then filed a second plea to the jurisdiction of the court
asserting API was on actual notice of the 2003 Judgment because the 2004
Judgment referred to it and, also, on constructive notice of the 2003
Judgment as it was filed for record before API purchased the land.2 2 4
API argued that the defendants intended third parties to rely on the 2004
Judgment, which gave its grantor, White, apparent fee ownership in the
acreage, and thus, since API had in fact relied on the 2004 Judgment, it
was a good faith purchaser. 2 2 ' The second plea to the jurisdiction was
denied by the trial court.2 2 6 Ultimately, the court of appeals held API was
a good-faith purchaser for value because the 2003 Judgment was
superseded by the 2004 Judgment and affirmed the trial court's denial of
the plea to the jurisdiction.

2 27

The defendants appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.2 2 8 The court
deemed the 2004 Judgment void. 2 2 9 Thus, with the 2003 Judgment being
222. Id. at *4.
223. See id.at *5 (concluding API must have owned an interest in the property to bring its
inverse condemnation claim, and since API might be an innocent purchaser, a fact question existed
that precluded the trial court from granting a plea to the jurisdiction). Upon remand to the trial
court, the City and TxDOT established through evidence that the 2003 Judgment was recorded in
the official records of the county on April 28, 2004, prior to API's purchase of the land in August 30,
2004. Ciy of Edinburg, 328 S.W.3d at 88.
224. See City of Edinbu 328 S.W.3d at 88 (noting the defendants attached a copy of the 2003
Judgment showing it was recorded before API bought the property).
225. Id. at 89.
226. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2013), revg
City of Edinburg v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 328 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2010).
227. See CO of Edinbuig 328 S.W.3d at 91-92, 94-95 (denying the plea of sovereign immunity
because API had a sufficient property interest as a good faith purchaser of the land to maintain the
action for inverse condemnation against the City and TxDOT).
228. A.P.I, 397 S.W.3d at 163.
229. Id.at 168. In arriving at the conclusion that the judgment nunc pro tunc was void, the
court stated:
A judgment nunc pro tunc can correct a clerical error in the original judgment, but not a
judicial one. An attempted nunc pro tunc judgment entered after the trial court loses plenary
jurisdiction is void if it corrects judicial rather than clerical errors. "A clerical error is one which
does not result from judicial reasoning or determination." Even a significant alteration to the
original judgment may be accomplished through a judgment nunc pro tunc so long as it merely
corrects a clerical error. If "the signed judgment inaccurately reflects the true decision of the
and may be corrected."
court," then "the error is clerical
Here, the change was undeniably significant. The 2003 Judgment granted a fee simple to the
City, while the 2004 Judgment purported to turn the City's outright ownership into a mere
easement. Again, the fact that the change was significant is not fatal to the 2004 Judgment's
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valid, the City held fee-simple tide in the subject acreage, and API's

grantor, having no interest in the land, could
not sell-and API could not
0
23
buy-any property interest from him.
API raised two theories as to why, even in the face of the void
judgment, it should prevail.2 31 First, API claimed the defense of innocent

purchaser for value.2 3 2 The court rejected this theory for several
reasons. 2 3 3 First, the court said the innocent purchaser "doctrine does
' 2 34

not protect a purchaser whose chain of tide includes a void deed.
Furthermore, the court indicated the doctrine has been codified, and by

the statute's terms one cannot be an innocent purchaser for value of land
when a recorded judgment is in one's chain of tide. 23" Further, relying on

the Westland Oil case, the court then concluded: "API, constructively and
actually aware of the recorded 2003 Judgment, was responsible for
nunc pro tunc status. However, TxDOT and the City produced evidence showing that the 2003
Judgment correctly reflected the underlying judicial determination, and no party produced any
evidence indicating that the 2004 Judgment was merely correcting a clerical error. That is,
nothing suggests that the 2003 Judgment really meant to convey to the City an easement rather
than a fee simple.
Further, the trial court in this case was by law required to adopt the award of the special
commissioners, who in turn granted the fee-simple title the City sought in its condemnation
petition. If parties do not timely object to a special commissioners' report, the trial court is
required to enter "the [special] commissioners' findings as the judgment of the court."
Objection is timely only if raised within [twenty] days of the special commissioners' award.
Here, the parties point to no evidence of a timely objection. Indeed, the 2003 Judgment
indicated that no party objected to the award. Therefore, the trial court could "only perform its
ministerial function and render judgment based upon the commissioner[s'] award." The trial
court did just that in the 2003 Judgment, awarding compensation for fee[-]simple tide.
Conversely, the 2004 Judgment exceeded the scope of this "ministerial function" by shrinking
the interest awarded by the special commissioners from a fee simple to an easement. As the
special commissioners' award was not changed pursuant to timely objection, the 2004 Judgment
was void.
One more timing issue cuts against API: the expiration of the trial court's plenary power.
Such power usually lasts [thirty] days. The 2004 Judgment, though labeled a [j]udgment [n]unc
[p]ro [t]unc, was undeniably a substantive alteration to the 2003 Judgment. However, the trial
court's plenary power to make substantive alterations had expired 300-plus days before the
2004 Judgment was rendered.
Id. at 167-68 (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
230. Id. at 168.
231. See generally id. at 168-70 (rejecting API's innocent purchaser claim and equitable estoppel
contention).
232. Id. at 168.
233. See generaly id. at 168-69 (challenging API's status as an innocent purchaser).
234. Id. at 168 (citing Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1908, writ
ref'd)).
235. See id. (recognizing Texas Property Code section 13.001 codified the doctrine). API
acknowledged it was aware of the 2003 Judgment before purchasing the property. Id.
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squaring it with the contradictory 2004 Judgment.",23 6

In rejecting API's

bona fide purchaser argument, the court stated that Slaughter was "not to
the contrary" of the language quoted above. 2 37

Even so, the court

strongly rejected Slaughtes obiter dicta in the following words:
[I]he Slaughter dicta suggests that such purchasers merit protection under
equitable estoppel principles (describing a contrary result as "inequitable")
and not under the innocent-purchaser doctrine codified in the Property
Code. Section 13.001 defines the elements of innocent-purchaser status for
all cases, and courts may not disregard or rewrite the statute when they
believe straight-up application would be inequitable.
The statute is
categorical and makes no case-by-case exceptions: A purchaser
with notice
238
of an adverse interest cannot claim innocent-purchaser status.
The second theory raised by API was based on the theory of equitable
estoppel.2 3 9 As both defendants acquiesced to the 2004 Judgment, and

because API relied on the facially valid judgment, API argued the
defendants should be estopped from challenging its status as an innocent
purchaser. 2 40 While acknowledging this argument had "certain force, ' 2 4 '
the court held the doctrine of equitable estoppel was inapplicable in this
236. Id. at 169. The court recognized its holding in Westland Oil from thirty years prior. Id.
(quoting Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982), revg 620 S.W.2d
765 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981)). It is interesting to note the concurring opinion recognized that
at times it might be difficult, "depending on the state of the record,.., for an appellate court to discern
which of two conflicting judgments accurately 'reflects the true decision of the [trial] court."' Id.
at 172 (Lehrmann, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Andrews v. Koch,
702 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)). Justice Lehrmann continued by stating "[a] thorough
review of this record ... conclusively shows that the true decision of the trial court, as reflected in
the 2003 Judgment, was to award fee[-]simple title to the City." Id. at 173 (emphasis added). From
the tone of her opinion, one must assume a subsequent purchaser from an individual whose title is
derived from a nunc pro tunc judgment must thoroughly review the trial court record to determine if
the nunc pro tunc judgment is in fact a judgment merely correcting a clerical error and, thus,
accurately reflects the true decision of the trial court. See id.
(agreeing API was unable to acquire legal
title from its grantor since the 2004 Judgment was void, and indicating a thorough review of the trial
court's record would have indicated the trial court's true decision was to vest the City with fee-simple
title).
237. Id. at 169 (majority opinion) (citing Slaughter v. Quails, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. 1942)).
The court's earlier pronouncement regarded the inapplicability of the innocent purchaser doctrine to
"protect a purchaser whose chain of title includes a void deed." Id. at 168 (citing Wall, 118 S.W.
at 888).
238. Id. at 169 (footnotes omitted).
239. See id.
at 170 (reiterating API's argument that TxDOT is barred from objecting to the 2004
Judgment it previously acquiesced to).
240. Id.
241. See id. (responding to the argument that "purchasers should be able to rely upon facially
valid judgments").
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case. 2 4 2 The court stated: "For estoppel to apply against the government,
two requirements must exist: (1) 'the circumstances [must] clearly demand
[estoppel's] application to prevent manifest injustice,' and (2) no
governmental function can be impaired. '24 3 The first requirement was
not satisfied because the court found no evidence of deliberate
244
inducement in the case but only evidence of mistaken acquiescence.
The court also noted estoppel was not available since the governmental
45
As to the second
error was clearly discoverable in this case. 2
requirement, the court held accommodating API's ownership of the
property would restrict TxDOT's ability to successfully complete the
drainage project. 24 6 Having disposed of all of API's arguments, the court
determined there was no viable takings claim; therefore, the trial court did
the court reversed
not have jurisdiction over the case.2 4 7 Consequently,
24 8
case.
the
dismissed
and
the court of appeals' decision

C. Analysis and Crilique of the A.P.I. Case
Existing precedent indicates a purchaser is bound by the recitals set
forth in the documents in his chain of title. 2 4 9 In this light, one can
attempt to follow the A.P.I. court's rationale: actual notice of the 2003
Judgment and the later 2004 Judgment charged API with the responsibility
for determining the legal effects of each of those judgments or, as the
court said, to "squar[e]" the two contradictory judgments. 2 0 To square
242. See id. (comparing this case to the only two cases where the court applied the doctrine of
estoppel against a governmental entity (citations omitted)).
243. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
244. Id.
245. Id. The court reasoned that "API could have examined the conflicting judgments" and
discovered the following "[r]ed flags": "(1) the 2004 Judgment was styled a nunc pro tunc even
though it made a judicial change, not a clerical one; (2) it was issued long after the 2003 Judgment;
[and] (3) it nowhere mentioned the unobjected-to special commissioners' award." Id. Earlier in its
opinion, the court pointed out that under section 21.061 of the Texas Property Code, if no one
objects to the special commissioners' award, the court can only perform the "ministerial function" of
entering "the [special] commissioners' findings as the judgment of the court." Id. at 167 (alteration in
original) (citations omitted). There was no evidence in this case of timely objection. Id.
246. Since the property was purchased for the drainage ditch, the court reasoned that
defendants' inability "to freely dig on the land" would burden the undisputed governmental function.
Id. at 171.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Westiand Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982)
(acknowledging established law that binds purchasers by every recital and reference in instruments in
their chain of title (citations omitted)).
250. See AP., 397 S.W.3d at 169 ("API, constructively and actually aware of the recorded
2003Judgment, was responsible for squaring it with the contradictory 2004Judgment."); see also
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the 2003 Judgment with the 2004 Judgment, API would have needed to
inquire into the legal bases of each decision to determine its validity.25 1
API would be charged with notice of those facts that a prudent individual
could have ascertained from such inquiry.25 2 This inquiry would have
included a thorough review of the trial court clerk's record to determine
what the original petition for condemnation sought-a right of way or a
fee-simple title. 2 53

This review of the clerk's record would have also

included an examination of the special commissioners' report to determine
what interest was being conveyed. 25 4 Finally, the clerk's record would
contain the 2003 Judgment itself, which awarded fee-simple tide to the
City, recited that the 2003 Judgment was in conformity with the special
commissioners' report, and disclosed no objections had been made to that
report.2 55 With this knowledge gleaned from the trial court clerk's record,
API would have determined the 2003 Judgment was in legal conformity
with the Texas Property Code. 25 6 The Property Code provides that if no
objection is made to the special commissioners' report, the court is
required to enter "the special commissioners' findings as the judgment of
the court."' 25" As such, the trial court could "only perform its ministerial
function and render judgment based upon the commissioner[s]

Cherry v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 160 S.W.2d 908, 911 ('rex. 1942) (imputing purchasers with
notice of the recorded instruments in their chain of title and with their legal effect (first citing
Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 216 S.W. 382, 383 (Tex. 1919); and then citing Strong v. Strong,
98 S.W.2d 346, 348 ('rex. 1936))); Leonard, 216 S.W. at 383 (refusing to allow individuals to ignore the
legal effects of documents duly recorded).
251. See Leonard, 216 S.W. at 383-84 (concluding the "inquiry for incumbrances should not have
stopped with the date of the patent or its registry, but obviously it should have been carried back to
the date of the original entry by the homesteader, as that marks the date and source of the tide
indicated by the patent." (quoting Dickerson v. Bridges, 48 S.W. 825, 827 (Mo. 1898))); 6( API.,
397 S.W.3d at 170 (reasoning equitable estoppel cannot apply as the governmental entities' error was
discoverable since "API could have examined the conflicting judgments and seen that the 2004
Judgment was issued in error" given "[r]ed flags were plentiful").
252. See, e.g.,
Flack v. First Nat'l Bank of Dalhart, 226 S.W.2d 628, 631-32 (Tex. 1950) (noting
one is charged with notice of all facts that inquiry would lead one to ascertain with due diligence).
253. SeeA.PI., 397 S.W.3d at 165 (indicating the original petition for condemnation sought "fee
title").
254. See id.(noting the special commissioners' report referred to the interest "conveyed as a
'right of way"' but it incorporated the City's original petition "which described the interest sought as
a 'fee tide"').
255. Id.
256. See id.
at 167-68 ("[T]he trial court in this case was by law required to adopt the award of
the special commissioners, who in turn granted the fee-simple title
the City sought in its
condemnation petition."); see also TEX. PROP. CODE 5 21.061 (West 2016) (depriving a party of the
ability to alter the commissioners' findings absent a timely filed objection).
257. PROP. § 21.061.
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award,"2' 5 8 which it did in the 2003 Judgment. 2 59 Having completed this
inquiry, API would then be faced with determining the validity of the
agreed upon 2004 Judgment, 26 0 which changed the interest conveyed to
the City from fee-simple title to a mere easement.2 6 1 While even the
A.P.L court acknowledged that a "significant alteration to the original
judgment may be accomplished through a judgment nunc pro tunc so long
as it merely corrects a clerical error,''262 a review of the trial court clerk's
record, as outlined above, would have established that the 2004 Judgment
did not just make a clerical change to the earlier judgment; instead, it made
a substantive judicial change to the earlier judgment. 2 63 Therefore, upon
proper inquiry notice, API would have determined that the 2004 Judgment
264
was void since it was signed outside the trial court's plenary power;
thus, API would have had actual knowledge of an adverse interest-the
City's fee simple interest-and could not claim to be an innocent
purchaser. 2 65 Furthermore, the fact that the 2004Judgment was an
2 66
as parties
agreed judgment would not have changed this determination,

267
cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by agreement.

258. John v. State, 826 S.W.2d 138, 141 n.5 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam) (citing Pearson v. State,
315 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. 1958)).
259. A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 167-68.
260. See id. at 165 n.2 (indicating it isunclear as to why the parties agreed to the 2004 Judgment).
261. Id. at 167.
262. Id. Indeed, if the trial court's signed judgment does not accurately reflect the court's true
decision, the error is considered "clerical and may be corrected." Id. (quoting Andrews v. Koch,
702 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)).
263. See id.at 168 (regarding the 2004 Judgment as one which "was undeniably a substantive
alteration to the 2003 Judgment" despite its judgment nunc pro tunc label and the expiration of the
court's plenary power).
264. See id.("m[The trial court's plenary power to make substantive alterations had expired 300plus days before the 2004 Judgment was rendered."). The trial court's power to make any
substantive changes to a judgment, under the best of circumstances, can never exceed 105 days after
the date of signing the judgment. See L.M. Healthcare, Inc. v. Childs, 929 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex.
1996) (per curiam) (referencing the seventy-five- and thirty-day rules for plenary power (first citing
TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c); and then citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e))). However, when a judgment is
modified in any respect by written order during the trial court's plenary jurisdiction, the trial court
then has "plenary power to set aside or to further modify or reform that judgment within 30 days,
absent another motion extending the time periods." Bd. of Trs. v. Toungate, 958 S.W.2d 365, 367
(Tex. 1997) (first citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(h); and then citing TEX. R. CiV. P. 329b(d)).
265. See A.P., 397 S.W.3d at 172-73 (Lehrmann, J., concurring) (arguing a thorough review of
the record shows the 2004 Judgment was void and that the trial court's true decision was reflected in
the 2003 Judgment awarding the City with fee-simple tide).
266. See id.at 165 (majority opinion) (describing how the two judgments came to exist, and
pointing out the 2004 Judgment was agreed to by the parties' attorneys).
267. See, e.g., Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 649 (Tex. 1933) (indicating subject matter
jurisdiction "cannot be conferred by agreement" since such "jurisdiction exists by reason of the
authority vested in the court by the Constitution, or by statutes not in conflict therewith" (citations

2016]

TIME TO REPAIR THE CHAIN

Thus, by reviewing the trial court clerk's record, API would have been
charged with the knowledge that the 2004 Judgment was void and that the
2003 Judgment, being valid, conveyed the fee-simple title to the property
to the City, leaving nothing for API's grantor to convey to API.2 6 8
By applying the A.P.L court's expanded notion of inquiry notice, one
can attempt, once more, to follow the court's rejection of API's innocent
purchaser argument.2 69 It is clear that one cannot claim the status of an
innocent purchaser for value when one has nolice of an adverse claim, as API
clearly had, namely, actual knowledge of the 2003 Judgment. 27 0 However,
in attempting to distinguish its earlier Slaughter opinion, 27 1 the court

created confusion concerning the validity of its earlier pronouncement that
the innocent purchaser for value "doctrine does not protect a purchaser
whose chain of title includes a void deed: 'One holding under a void tide
cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser."''

27 2

The source of this

confusion arises from the following language in the court's decision: "API,
constructively and actually aware of the recorded 2003 Judgment, was
responsible for squaring it with the contradictory 2004 Judgment. Slaughter
v. Qualls, on which the court of appeals relied, is not to the contrary. "273
In the A.P.L case, the "squaring" of the two judgments, as shown
above, would have led API to the determination that the 2003 Judgment
was valid and the 2004 Judgment was void. 2 7 4 Thus, under the court's
analysis, API would have had notice of an adverse interest and, thus, could
not claim the status of innocent purchaser. 27 5 In Slaughter, the court of
omitted)).
268. See A.P., 397 S.W.3d at 168-69 (rejecting API's claim since API should have squared the
2004 Judgment with the 2003 Judgment and upon doing so, would have discovered the
2004 Judgment failed to convey any interest to any party as it was void, thus, depriving API's grantor
of any interest to transfer).
269. See id. at 166 (deciding API was not entitled to innocent purchaser status).
270. See id at 168 ("[O]ne cannot be 'innocent' of a recordedjudgment, and here, API concedes it
knew of the recorded 2003 Judgment before it purchased the property.").
271. See id. at 169 (equating the statements set forth by the Slaughtercourt with "dicta").
272. Id. at 168 (quoting Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1908, writ
ref'd)). More recently, the court stated this principle less definitively. See Wood v. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A., No. 14-0714, 2016 WL 2993923, at *6 (Tex. May 20, 2016) ("Typically, a void deed in the
chain of title would foreclose the bona-fide purchaser defense." (citations omitted)); see also Hous.
First Am. Say. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 769 (rex. 1983) (noting the mortgagor would be estopped
from asserting that a nonjudicial foreclosure was void because the trustee's deed gave the
"appearance of good title" in the purchaser at the foreclosure sale (citing Slaughter v. Quails,
162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. 1942))).
273. A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 169 (citing Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675).
274. See id. (charging API with notice of an adverse interest since API was responsible for
squaring the judgments).
275. See id. (noting that under section 13.001 of the Texas Property Code, which defines the
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appeals held there was no evidence the subsequent purchasers had notice
the trustee's deed in their chain of title was void;2 7 6 and, by way of obiter
dicta, the supreme court stated such subsequent purchasers acquired good
title as against the mortgagor of the improperly foreclosed deed of
trust.2 7 7 For Slaughter not to be contrary, as the AP.I. court asserted, the
A.P.I. court must have concluded the subsequent purchasers' inquiry
notice in Slaughterwould have resulted in a determination that the trustee's
sale and deed were valid, and as a result, they had no notice of an adverse
interest.2 7 8 Thus, the subsequent purchasers from the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale in Slaughter apparently would not have been charged with
going behind the trustee's deed or, at least, they would not have been
charged with going behind the deed of trust that authorized the trustee to
give apparent title to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. 2 7 9 Their
inquiry would end there, and they would not have to inquire further to
determine whether the actual substitute trustee conducted the foreclosure
sale, whether the debt was in default, or whether the other recitals
contained in the trustee's deed were correct.28 ° Such further inquiry

elements of innocent purchaser status in all cases, a "purchaser with notice of an adverse interest
cannot claim innocent-purchaser status").
276. Slaughter v. Quails, 149 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941), affd,
162 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1942).
277. See Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675 (relying on principles of equity to provide innocent
purchaser protection).
278. CfA.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 169 (Tex.2013) (indicating Slaughter"is not to the contrary" while
simultaneously holding API was not an innocent purchaser since API had notice of an adverse
interest and had the responsibility to square the contradictory judgments in its chain of title).
279. See Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675 (protecting the mortgagee and lessee who acquired their
interests from the purchaser at a void foreclosure sale who held apparent title, and failing to impute
upon them a requirement to ensure the sale was proper); see akeo API., 397 S.W.3d at 169 ("[A]ny
description, recital of fact, or reference to other documents puts the purchaser upon inquiry, and he
is bound to follow up on this inquiry...." (alteration in original) (quoting Westland Oil Dev. Corp.
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 903 (Tex. 1982), rev 620 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1981))).
280. Compare Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 674-75 (establishing the trustee's deed appeared to contain
all of the recitals necessary to show the sale was valid to subsequent purchasers and, thus, protecting
those who purchased the property "in good faith in reliance thereon," in spite of the sale's
deficiencies), with A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 168 (asserting the innocent purchaser doctrine is inapplicable
contains a recorded, void instrument, and putting subsequent purchasers on
when the chain of title
inquiry notice of such judgments). If this inquiry notice established the trustee's deed contained
statements concerning the sale that were not authorized by the deed of trust, the purchaser would be
placed on further inquiry to see if the facts recited were correct. See, e.g., Bowman v. Oakley,
212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, 1919, writ refd) (concluding subsequent purchasers
were not innocent purchasers where they incorrectly assumed the trustee had the power to conduct
the sale due to recitals in the trustee's deed that the deed of trust did not authorize the trustee to
include therein).
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would have resulted in a determination that the foreclosure sale was
void. 281 However, for Slaughter to be consistent with the A.P.I. case, the
A.P.I. court must have concluded that the subsequent purchasers in
Slaughter were not charged with such further inquiry and were innocent
purchasers as they had no notice of an adverse interest in spite of a void
deed being in their chain of titie. 28 2 Yet such a conclusion would directly
conflict with the A.P.. court's bold assertion that one could not be an
innocent purchaser when there was a void deed in one's chain of titie,
because, in Slaughter, there was a void deed in the subsequent purchasers'
chain of tide.28 3 Therefore, it is clear that Slaughter contradicts A.P.I., in
spite of the A.P.I. court's assertion to the contrary. 28 4 This confusion
created by the A.P.I. opinion needs to be clarified.
In addition, the A.P.I. court's treatment of the Slaughter obiter dicta and
its discussion finding TxDOT and the City were not equitably estopped by
their acquiescence to the 2004 Judgment leads to further confusion in
regards to the state of the law governing the case of a void instrument in
one's chain of tide. 28 5 As noted above, the Slaughter court considered it
inequitable to allow a mortgagor to defeat subsequent purchasers when,
through the execution of the deed of trust, the mortgagor "made it
possible for the trustee to create the appearance of tide" in the purchaser
at the void foreclosure sale. 2 86 In rejecting the obiter dicta from the
281. See Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675 (determining the "foreclosure sale and trustee's deed were
absolutely void" since the deed of trust specified a foreclosure sale was authorized only upon the
debtor's default and once this condition was satisfied, the foreclosure sale could only be conducted
by "the trusteen or a duly appointed substitute trustee," and neither of these conditions were
complied with).
282. See id. at 676 (classifying the purchase of the property as one made in good faith because
the subsequent purchasers had no notice of the invalidity of the trustee's deed).
283. Compare id. at 675 (concluding "the foreclosure sale and trustee's deed were absolutely
void" but extending innocent purchaser status to those who "purchased in good faith in reliance
thereon"), with A.P.., 397 S.W.3d at 168 (rejecting the availability of innocent purchaser protection
when there is a void deed in one's chain of title (citing Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (iTex. Civ.
App. Austin 1908, writ ref'd))).
284. See A.P.I., 397 S.W.3d at 169 (expressing the view that Slaughter "is not to the contrary"
(citing Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675)).
285. See generally id. at 168-71 (relying upon Texas Property Code section 13.001 in refusing to
recognize equitable estoppel principles that would deem API an innocent purchaser, yet then
evaluating API's claim of equitable estoppel under a seemingly different standard).
286. Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675. As was shown above in Part III.B of this Article, equity has
consistently been used to protect creditors or subsequent purchasers when the individual seeking to
defeat the rights of the subsequent purchasers is the very individual who clothed the grantor of the
subsequent purchaser or creditor with apparent legal tide. See Hussey v. Moser, 7 S.W. 606, 608
(Tex. 1888) (suggesting a married woman who concealed facts that her daughter signed and
acknowledged her name to a deed giving it the appearance of a valid conveyance might be estopped
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Slaughter case, the A.P. court held the "shall" statute "defines the
elements of innocent-purchaser status for all cases, and courts may not
disregard" the statute because its application would be inequitable.2 8 7
However, in the very next paragraph, the court intimated that principles of
equitable estoppel might be used to protect innocent purchasers by stating:
"API argues that TxDOT's acquiescence to the 2004 Judgment bars it
from objecting now to what it accepted then. While the argument has a
certain force-purchasers should be able to rely upon facially valid
judgments--this argument goes to equitable estoppel. . ,288 This
language creates ambiguity and confusion given the court's earlier rejection
of the obiter dicta of the Slaughtercase.2 8 9
The Slaughter court applied equitable estoppel to protect innocent
purchasers who had a void deed in their chain of tide when they acquired
their interests from one holding legal and apparent title.2 9 0 The A.P.I.
court seemingly acknowledged the possible application of equitable
estoppel to protect a purchaser who purchased from one whose tide was
derived from an agreed "facially valid judgment" in spite of the fact that
such judgment was void.2 91 In both situations, a subsequent purchaser
acquired property from one who was clothed with apparent legal tide by
the very person who later argued the subsequent purchaser was not an
innocent purchaser. 2 9 2 If equity can possibly assist one, why can it not
come to the aid of the other? Given the inconsistencies and confusion
generated by the A.P.I. opinion as it relates to subsequent purchasers with
a void instrument in their chain of tide 2 93 this Article now proposes to
for the protection of innocent third parties); Randolph v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock,
141 S.W.2d 1030, 1034 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) (stating equity will
protect an innocent purchaser from one who clothed another with "authority to bind him" (citations
omitted)).
287. A.P.I., 397 S.W.3d at 169 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE § 13.001 (West 2012)).
288. Id. at 170.
289. See id.at 169 (refuting the suggestion set forth in the Slaughter opinion that equitable
principles can apply to protect innocent purchasers (citing Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675)).
290. Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675.
291.A.P.I., 397 S.W.3d at 170.
292. See id. at 166, 168 (reiterating API's argument that it should be protected as an innocent
purchaser because when purchasing the property from its grantor, it relied upon the agreed to 2004
Judgment, which purported to reduce the City's ownership to a mere easement and clothed its
grantor with apparent tile); Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675 (basing its application of equitable principles
on the mortgagor's "execution of the deed of trust [that] made it possible for the trustee to create the
appearance of good title in" the purchaser at the foreclosure sale).
293. Compare A.P.I, 397 S.W.3d at 168-69 (declaring the innocent purchaser statute and
equitable estoppel principles inapplicable in cases where the purchaser's chain of tide contains a void
deed), with Slaughter, 162 S.W.2d at 675 (noting it would be inequitable to allow the mortgagor to
undermine the innocent purchaser's tide when his actions created the appearance of good title in the
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suggest ways to resolve these inconsistencies and clear up the confusion.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE TO REPAIR A CHAIN OF TITLE
CONTAINING A VOID INSTRUMENT

This Article pointed out that in several situations Texas courts applied
equitable principles to protect a subsequent purchaser in spite of the
existence of a void deed in her chain of tile. However, the A.P.I. court
did not acknowledge these equitable exceptions. 2 9 4 Instead, it reiterated
the rule of law that one cannot be an innocent purchaser if there is a void
deed in the chain of title. 29 5 Furthermore, the court rejected any equitable
exceptions to the "shall" recording statue.2 9 6 This Article proposes
legislation to clearly and unequivocally reinstate the equitable doctrine of
the innocent purchaser for value in Texas jurisprudence. Furthermore, as
previously noted in this Article, it is unclear from the A.P.I court's
opinion whether the mere existence of a void deed in one's chain of title is
sufficient to charge one with notice of an adverse interest or whether one
can be an innocent purchaser if one has no knowledge of the existence of
a void instrument in the chain of title and the corresponding adverse
interest after sufficient inquiry.2 9 7 This unsettled area of the law needs
clarification, and legislation is necessary to correct the present imbalance
existing between a creditor or a subsequent purchaser for valuable
consideration without notice of a void instrument in the chain of title and
the individual who clothed the creditor's or subsequent purchaser's grantor
with apparent title. Additionally, the legislature should overrule the court's
expansion of the doctrine of implied actual notice that has imposed an
unrealistic burden upon creditors and subsequent purchasers.2 98 In that
light, the author proposes the following amendments to the Texas
Property Code to read as follows:

trustee).
294. See generaly A.P., 397 S.W.3d at 168-69 (limiting innocent purchaser status to that
conferred by Texas Property Code section 13.001 and broadly stating, without qualification, that one
cannot be an innocent purchaser with a void deed in one's chain of tile).
295. Id. at 168.
296. See id. at 169 ("Section 13.001 [of the Texas Property Code] defines the elements of
innocent-purchaser status for all cases, and courts may not disregard or rewrite the statute when they
believe straight-up application would be inequitable. The statute is categorical and makes no case-bycase exceptions .... ").
297. See supra Part IV.C.
298. Cf. McSwain, supra note 200, at 650 ("]he 'chain of tide rule' does not impute to a
purchaser notice of all facts ... rather, only of those which reasonably refer to and serve to excite his
interest in tide matters.").
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5 13.000 Definitions (New)
(a) In this Chapter:
(1) "Apparent title" means such written evidence as
under the laws of the state confers upon the vendor the
legal estate in the land.
(2) "Notice" means knowledge or facts that can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry and that would appear to
be tide related to an ordinary prudent creditor or
subsequent purchaser.

299

5 13.002 Effect of Recorded Instruments (Revised)
(a) An instrument, other than a forged instrument, that is
"recorded in the proper county is:"
(1) "notice to all persons of the existence of the
instrument;"
(2) not notice that the recorded instrument is void; and
(3) "subject to inspection by the public."3 ° °
§ 13.006 Creditors and Subsequent Purchasers and Void Instruments
(New)
(a) Creditors of and subsequent purchasers for a valuable
consideration from one having apparent title and without
notice, take free and clear of all titles, equities, and adverse
interests.
(b) The existence of a void instrument in one's chain of
title does not prevent a creditor or subsequent purchaser for a
valuable consideration without notice of the corresponding
adverse interest from being an innocent purchaser for
value.

30 1

299. This section represents a proposed addition to the Texas Property Code formulated by the
author to assist in clarifying the confusion currently associated with innocent purchaser status and to
remedy the notice stringencies imposed by the A.P.I. decision. See A.P.L., 397 S.W.3d at 169
(imputing notice of an adverse interest and requiring the subsequent purchaser to square conflicting
instruments where the purchaser believed the subsequent instrument superseded the conflicting,
previous judgment).
300. For comparison purposes, the statute regarding the effects of recorded instruments, as it
currently exists in the Texas Property Code, provides: "An instrument that is property recorded in
the proper county is: (1) notice to all
persons of the existence of the instrument; and (2) subject to
inspection by the public." TEX. PROP. CODE § 13.002 (West 2016).
301. Contra A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 168 (indicating the innocent purchaser doctrine "does not
protect a purchaser whose chain of title includes a void deed," and extinguishing the applicability of
equitable principles in light of the doctrine's codification in the Property Code). The statutory
provision relied upon by the A.P.L court only extends its protection to creditors and subsequent
purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice of unrecorded instruments reflecting a
conveyance of,interest in, or mortgage or deed of trust on real property. PROP. § 13.001 (a)-(b).
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These proposed changes will return equitable considerations into the
analysis of innocent purchaser status. In doing so, several significant
changes are made to the law of notice. First, the proposed amended
statute (proposed section 13.002 Effect of Recorded Instruments)
provides for constructive notice of all recorded instruments, even those
However, under proposed
that are void, other than forgeries. 30 2
sections 13.002 and 13.006, creditors and subsequent purchasers will not
be charged with constructive notice that a recorded instrument in their
chain of title is in fact void. 30 3 The statutory changes will clarify that the
mere existence of a recorded void instrument in one's chain of title will
not deprive a creditor or subsequent purchaser of innocent purchaser
status." 4 Finally, the proposed statute curtails the growth of implied
of
302. Currently, the statute merely provides that a properly recorded instrument is notice to all
its existence and open to public inspection. PROP. 5 13.002.
303. Contra A.P.L, 397 S.W.3d at 169 (depriving the subsequent purchaser of innocent
purchaser status since the purchaser could have discovered the invalidity of the instrument on which
they relied, thus, charging them with notice of an adverse interest). The Texas Property Code, in its
current state, is silent as to whether one is on notice of the effect of properly recorded instruments
and instead, merely provides that a properly recorded instrument is notice of its existence. PROP.
13.002.
304. It should be noted that, effective September 1, 2015, the Texas Property Code was
amended to provide a procedure for the rescission of certain nonjudicial foreclosure sales of
residential real property. PROP. 5 51.016. The statute states that the trustee, substitute trustee, or
mortgagee may rescind a nonjudicial foreclosure sale if:
(1) the statutory requirements for the sale were not satisfied;
(2) the default leading to the sale was cured before the sale;
(3) a receivership or dependent probate administration involving the property was pending at
the time of sale;
(4) a condition specified in the conditions of sale prescribed by the trustee or substitute trustee
before the sale and made available in writing to prospective bidders at the sale was not met;
(5) the mortgagee or mortgage servicer and the debtor agreed before the sale to cancel the sale
based on an enforceable written agreement by the debtor to cure the default; or
(6) at the time of the sale, a court-ordered or automatic stay of the sale imposed in a bankruptcy
case filed by a person with an interest in the property was in effect.
Id.
§ 51.016(b). In each of these instances, the nonjudicial foreclosure sale would be considered void
under existing law regardless of the rescission. See Cont'l Casing Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp.,
751 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (citing the United States Supreme Court for the
proposition that "[a]n action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void, not merely voidable"
(citations omitted)); Hous. First Am. Say. v. Musick, 650 Se.W.2d 764, 769 (Tex. 1983) (holding a
foreclosure sale invalid because the notice of sale did not comply with the requirements of the deed
of trust and the statute); First S. Props., Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339, 341-42 (Tex. 1976)
(affirming the lower courts' holdings that the substitute trustee's deed was void because there was no
authorization by a court to conduct the foreclosure sale of "property held in custodia legis by a duly
appointed receiver"); Pearce v. Stokes, 291 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. 1956) (indicating a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale made during the pendency of an administration is void); Slaughter v. Qualls,
162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. 1942) (deeming the foreclosure void as the note was not in default and the
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actual notice, by limiting the scope of implied actual notice to title related

matters.30 5 It is time to repair the broken chain to protect creditors and
subsequent purchasers from being deprived of innocent purchaser status

due to the mere existence of a void instrument in their chain of tide.30 6
substitute trustee did not personally conduct the foreclosure sale); Henke v. First S. Props., Inc.,
586 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (determining the foreclosure was
void as the default had been cured).
However, interestingly enough, the statute also states:
A rescission of a foreclosure sale under this section is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice unless notice of the rescission has been
acknowledged, sworn to, or proved and filed for recording as required by law. A rescission of a
foreclosure sale under this section evidenced by an unrecorded instrument is binding on a party
to the instrument, on the party's heirs, and on a subsequent purchaser who does not pay a
valuable consideration or who has notice of the instrument.
PROP. § 51.016(i). This provision starts with a void foreclosure sale that, under the statute, may be
rescinded. Id. § 51.016(b), (i). However, even though the rescission was conducted, it was never
properly recorded, which would have given constructive notice to the world, and thus, the creditor or
subsequent purchaser had no actual notice of the rescission. Id. § 51.016(i); see also id. § 13.002
(declaring a properly recorded instrument provides notice to all persons that the instrument exists).
Thus, under the statute, the intervening creditor or subsequent purchaser of the property that was
sold at a void foreclosure sale apparently takes the property as an innocent purchaser despite the void
foreclosure deed in the chain of tide. Id. § 51.016(i). The statutory changes suggested in this Article
go substantially further and make it clear and unambiguous that a creditor or subsequent purchaser
for value and without notice can be an innocent purchaser in every situation where a void deed or
instrument is in her chain of title.
305. ContraA.PL, 397 S.W.3d at 169 (extending inquiry notice to facts contained within a trial
court's judgments and clerk's record).
306. The statutory changes proposed in this Article to protect innocent purchasers are
analogous to the Texas Constitution's provisions that protect innocent purchasers in the case of a
foreclosure of a lien securing a noncompliant home-equity loan. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6).
The Texas Constitution protects homesteads from foreclosure for the payment of debts except in
eight specific situations-one of which is home-equity loans. Id. § 50(a). Under the Constitution,
there are a set of terms and conditions that home-equity loans must include to be a compliant homeequity loan and, thus, foreclosure eligible. Id. § 50(a)(6)(A)-(Q. A home-equity loan can have other
terms and conditions, but failure to follow the constitutional terms and conditions will make the loan
noncompliant, thus, eliminating the option to foreclose on the homestead in the event of the
borrower's default. See Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15-0437, 2016 WL 2986237,
at *3 (Tex. May 20, 2016) (recognizing the Constitution does not prohibit home-equity loans made
on other terms, but "describes what a home-equity loan must look like if a lender wants the option to
foreclose on a homestead upon borrower default"). Furthermore, the Constitution specifically states
that no "lien on the homestead shall ever be valid unless it secures a debt described" in Section 50 of
the Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(c). Thus, liens securing noncompliant home-equity
loans are not valid. See Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 14-0741, 2016 WL 2993923, at *5
(Tex. May 20, 2016) (clarifying the common law categorization of void and voidable liens is not
applicable to the interpretation of the constitutional terminology of a valid lien). However, the
Constitution provides that noncompliant home-equity loans can be validated. TEX. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 50(a)(6)(Q(x); see also Doody v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 49 S.W.3d 342, 346-47 (Tex. 2001)
(agreeing a noncompliant home-equity loan is invalid until it is made valid by complying with the
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cure provisions contained in the Constitution (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x))). The
constitutional "cure provisions are te sole mechanism to bring a loan [that is noncompliant] into
constitutional compliance." HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 2993923, at *5. Until the cure provisions
are complied with, the "lien that was invalid from origination remains invalid." Id. The Constitution
gives the lender sixty days to cure after receiving notice that the loan is noncompliant. TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x).
However, notwithstanding the invalidity of a lien securing a noncompliant home-equity loan,
the Constitution protects innocent purchasers and provides that:
A purchaser for value without actual knowledge may conclusively presume that a lien securing
an extension of credit described by Subsection (a)(6) of this section was a valid lien securing the
extension of credit with homestead property if:
(1) the security instruments securing the extension of credit contain a disclosure that the
extension of credit secured by the lien was the type of credit defined by Section 50(a)(6), Article
XVI, Texas Constitution;
(2) the purchaser acquires the title to the property pursuant to or after the foreclosure of the
voluntary lien; and
(3) the purchaser is not the lender or assignee under the extension of credit.
Id. § 50(i). Thus, this constitutional protection of an innocent purchaser applies not only to
subsequent purchasers, but also to the initial purchaser at the foreclosure of the lien securing a
noncompliant loan. Id. Furthermore, the good faith purchaser is not charged with constructive
notice that the lien is invalid if the lien has the appearance of validity by containing a minimum
disclosure that the loan "secured by the lien was the type of credit defined" by the Constitution as a
home-equity loan. Id. In distinguishing the concept of an invalid lien under this constitutional
provision and the common law category of a void lien, the supreme court stated:
Typically, a void deed in the chain of tide would foreclose the bona-fide purchaser
However, section 50(i) provides such protection to home-equity foreclosure
defense....
purchasers without actual knowledge of a constitutional defect. This deviation from the
common-law treatment of void liens evinces an understanding that home-equity liens securing
constitutionally noncompliant loans do not neatly fit into a common-law category. By including
a bona-fide purchaser provision, section 50(i) effectively sets its own cut-off. Once a thirdparty buys without actual knowledge of the invalid lien, that transaction will not be undone
notwithstanding the invalid lien.
HSBC Bank USA, 2016 WL 2993923, at *5-6. The changes to the Texas Property Code concerning
innocent purchasers proposed in this Article would, in effect, establish its own cut off. Once a third
party without actual notice of a void instrument in her chain of tide purchases real property from a
seller who has apparent tide, that conveyance will not be avoided notwithstanding the void
instrument in the chain of title.
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